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                               Abstract 
 
Cooperation among human societies can be traced back to the ancient times when people 
started to live together. There are evidences showing that ancient civilizations had practiced 
cooperation among themselves from cooperative farming to establishing informal saving and 
loan associations (www, Umanitoba, 2011). Those informal financial institutions are still 
widely used in many low income countries and are channels by which substantial amount of 
economic and social activities are carried out. Scholars, however, are calling for the 
transformation of those informal institutions to formal ones. Suggestions had also given to the 
government to come up with a better policy to utilize as well as incorporate those institutions 
to the formal system. But before discussing and recommending policy improvements about 
the linkage, the reasons why the members join informal financial institutions should be 
studied. This will help to come up with the proper recommendation about how to utilize those 
institutions. The objective of this study was basically to investigate why members join equb 
while they can use other alternative. In addition the study was interested to look if the motive 
is different based on attributes like the size and location of equbs.  
 
The study is conducted using an empirical data collected in Ethiopia on Ethiopian RoSCAs 
known as Equb. Transaction cost theory is used as a grand theory. Earlier suggestions given 
by previous researchers on the field (that could be considered as middle range theories) are 
also used as the theoretical bases to conduct the research. Based on the theories, hypotheisis 
has been drawn and tested using the empirical data collected.  
 
Accordingly, the results revealed that the motive of members differ based on the size of the 
equb they are participating. The social motives owtweigh the financial motives for those 
individuas in small equbs, i.e small equb participants are more interested on the social life 
they enjoy form participation. To the contrary, the big equb members are financially 
motivated. The “durable good motive” have found appropriate for the medium size equb 
members. All those motives, however, can be satisfied using other institutions. Low 
transaction cost as well as high commitment feature in equbs is the reason why individuals 
join equbs instead of using other options. This is a different outcome as compared to previous 
studies conducted in the field where a generic proposition was forwarded irrespective of the 
different attributes that individuals and RoSCAs possess. 
 
Future research areas could be the change on the equb structure and operation if there is any, 
the trends of the change and why, how much reduction in transaction cost in informal 
institutions could attract members of equb, and the possible impact of introducing developed 
and modern “saving side” and “withdrawal side” commitment mechanisms in formal banking 
system on attracing equb members. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the general background of the research. It incorporates general 
overview about the topic, statement of the problem, objective, limitations, significance, and 
outline of the study. 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Cooperation among human societies can be traced back to the ancient times when people 
started to work together to enhance their efficiency in hunting, gathering, shelter construction 
and other activities. Historians have discovered evidence indicating cooperation among 
people in ancient civilizations like Greece, Rome and Egypt (www, CDI, 2011). 
Anthropologists have also uncovered evidence suggesting that Babylonians had practiced 
cooperative farming, while informal saving and loan associations, had been practiced in 
ancient China (www, Umanitoba, 2011). 
 
Those informal associations are still widely used in many low income countries. They are 
channels by which substantial amount of economic and social activities are carried out 
(Anderson et al., 2003). Bouman (1994) classified the functions of informal institutions into 
three: provision of security or insurance, economic function, and socialization. Life cycle 
events, religious ceremonies, education and rites of passage fall under the first category. The 
economic function involves the provision of loans and safekeeping facilities, development 
works for the community as well as collective investment. Activities that facilitate the ground 
for togetherness like meeting, drinking and eating together, and group recreational activities 
fall under the socializing function. For Sandsör (2010), however, some informal institutions 
can serve more than one function at a time. Among them Rotating Saving and Credit 
Associations (RoSCAs) are the most important ones. RoSCAs could be considered as 
economic and social institutions (Sandsör, 2010; Bouman, 1995), or cultural institutions 
(Sandsör, 2010).  
 
RoSCAs, one of the oldest saving institutions in the world (Gugerty, 2007), are associations 
formed by a group of people willing to make a regular contribution to a fund which will be 
given to each member in whole or part on rotation basis (Ardener, 1964). Despite the fact that 
RoSCAs differ from one place to the other in attributes like organizational structure 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Ardener, 1964), membership, contribution, and enforcing mechanisms 
(Ardener, 1964), they are more or less similar everywhere (Geertz, 1962; Anderson et al., 
2003; Ardener, 1964).   
 
In Ethiopia, a country where it is not uncommon to find cooperative activities among the 
people (Engdawork, 1995), informal self-help institutions have existed for a long period of 
time in their own version. Tirfe, (1999) divides those local institutions in the country into 
three groups: those associated with social functions (eg. mahiber), those associated with 
socio-economic welfare (eg. debo, meredaja), and those associated with traditional financial 
institutions (eg. equb, idir). His classification somehow is similar to the functions of informal 
institution given by Bouman (1995) and Sandsör (2010).  
 
This research focuses on the traditional financial institutions, specifically equb, an Ethiopian 
version of Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). “Equb is an association 
whereby members meet regularly to collect contributions of equal amount from every member 
and to allocate the amount” (Getaneh, 2005:8). It could be started within a group based on 
strong ties like friendship, business associates, school mates, or within the neighborhood. In 
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large equbs, individuals that do not have close relationship might become members though 
each member needs to be known by at least some other members in the group, and their moral 
standing should be known by the community (Mauri, 1987). The money in equb could be 
used for different purposes ranging from house building, startup of small business to cottage 
industries. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem  
 
In spite of the differences in the justifications they give to the raison d'être of RoSCAs, 
researchers in economics (Besley et al., 1993, 1994; Dejene, 1993), development studies 
(Bouman, 1994,1995; Tirfe, 1999) or anthropology (Ardener, 1964) agree on the huge role 
and potential that RoSCAs have in the daily life of the society practicing them.  
 
Study results cited by Bouman (1995) reveal a RoSCA membership rate of 50% to 95% 
among adult population in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gambia, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Togo 
and Ivory Cost. It has also been estimated that an amount equivalent to half of the national 
saving in Cameroon, double amount of saving in organized sector in Kerala (India), and 8% to 
10% of the GDP in Ethiopia was mobilized by RoSCAs. Anderson et al., (2009) survey in a 
slum in Kenya and observe that 57.2% of households in the study have at least one individual 
participating in a RoSCA. In a recent study in Ethiopia, Temesgen (2008) has found that the 
annual turnover of four equbs he consider in Addis Ababa, the capital city, was equivalent to 
0.15% of the net current deposit maintained by all commercial banks in the country by the end 
of August, 2007. This shows the significance of those institutions in Africa in general and in 
Ethiopia in particular. 
 
Given all those contributions and roles they play in the economy, RoSCAs cannot escape 
criticisms. In fact some scholars call for their improvement. Mauri (1987) has argued that the 
presence of those informal financial institutions in the economy would create dualism in the 
financial market at the macro level which will in turn contribute to inefficient allocation of 
resources. He further argued that those informal institutions couldnot accommodate the needs 
of the people as the income and saving of the people increase, and hence, need to be 
transformed. Other researchers like Dejene (1993) and Tirfe (1999) have also written about 
the possibility of transforming informal institutions into formal ones. 
  
Engdawork (1995) and Tirfe (1999) believe that many of the development projects in Ethiopia 
have not been successful mainly because they disregard and do not consider the expertise and 
knowhow the people have. This knowledge includes the operation of informal financial 
institutions. Dejene (1993) and Temesgen (2008) revealed the lack of proper policies in 
utilizing the institutions efficiently. But before discussing and recommending policy 
improvements about the linkage, the reasons why the members join informal financial 
institutions (for this case equb) should be studied. This will help to come up with a proper 
recommendation about how to utilize those institutions. However, so far only few studies 
have been undertaken in this regard.  
 
Kedir et al., (2011) discussed as to why people want to use both banks and equbs at the same 
time. The research was an econometric study using data from a panel survey of households 
conducted between 1994 and 2004 in urban Ethiopia. It was, hence totally focused on urban 
equbs. In another recent study, Temesgen (2008) discussed the potential of Equbs in Ethiopia. 
Even though he tried to assess the motives of equb participants to join, his four sample equbs 
were large equbs from the capital city implying that his focus was on the urban equbs. Thus 
this research will fill the gap by taking both the case of urban and rural Ethiopia. Cases will 
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also be taken from different size equbs which has not been done in previous researchs dealing 
with the motives of individuals to join. In addition, this research is fully devoted to 
exclusively investigate the reason why members join equb. Previous researches have been 
looking at the motives just as part of another study.  
 
This study deals with the very motives of members who join Equb by taking samples from 
small, medium and large equbs. In addition, the samples will be selected from both urban 
areas of the country – where members of equb are believed to have better access to formal 
financial institution services than those who are in rural areas – and rural areas – where access 
to financial institutions is very limited.  
 
1.3 Objective of the study 
 
The aim of the research is to investigate what motivate members to join RoSCAs by taking an 
Ethiopian RoSCA, equb, as a case. It endeavors to address the following research questions: 
 
 Why do members join equb while they can use other alternatives? 
 Once they join equbs, why do they want to keep on their participation? Are they 
satisfied with the service they enjoy out of it? 
 Do the motives of participants differ based on attributes like location of equb and size? 
 What lessons can the formal financial institutions draw from the motives of equb 
participants? 
To achieve those objectives and explore the reason why members join equbs, the researcher 
uses a hypothesis testing approach. This choice was made for two reasons. First, there are 
previous studies conducted in similar institutions in other countries that guide further research 
in the field. Thus, preceding hypothesis given by other researchers could be used as a guide to 
come up with new hypothesis for possible testing. Secondly, setting a hypothesis will make 
the questionnaire and response consistent, understandable as well as easy to summarize which 
will help to answer the research questions properly. The following four hypotheses are chosen 
to be tested in this research: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: The motives of members to join equb differ based on the equb size 
where they involve in. 
 Hypothesis 2: The motive of members in urban and rural equbs is different. 
 Hypothesis 3: The social motives outweigh the financial motives in small equbs.  
   Hypothesis 4: individuals in big equbs are more financially motivated than medium 
and small size equbs 
1.4 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
 
The study sample equbs are selected from the capital city and from a rural district situated in 
Amhara Regional State, North Wollo Administrative Zone, Meket Woreda. Although the 
researcher believed that there are other attributes that could be used to select samples like 
member composition and age of equb, the study only considers samples chosen based on two 
attributes – size (small, medium, large) and location (urban – rural) of equbs. The reason for 
limiting the samples is time and budget constraint as well as the complexity that will be faced 
in collecting and sorting out the data. 
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1.5 Significance of the study   
 
As stated in the statement of the problem section, the reason why participants join equb is one 
of the under researched topics in the area. Thus, a study conducted in the topic will contribute 
to the academic knowledge in the field. In real world, different stakeholders will benefit from 
this study. First, the research outcomes will help policy makers to have a better understanding 
about what members are expecting from equbs when they join. This understanding will in 
turn help to develop a better policy towards equbs if the government or any Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) should strive for the betterment of those institutions. 
Second, it will help financial institutions (both formal and semi-formal) know what their 
“potential customers” need and add new products to their menu. Finally, it will help the 
members themselves to get a better service once the formal institutions develop service ranges 
based on their needs. 
 
1.6 Outline 
 
The first chapter gives the reader a brief introduction on the study topic. It covers the problem 
statement, objective of the study, the study significance and the limitations of the research. 
The literatures related to the topic are discussed in the second chapter. The third chapter 
focuses on the method used in conducting the research. The empirical data collected from 
field is systematically presented in the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, the empirical 
findings are analysed and discussed using the theoretical framework discussed in chapter two 
as well as in relation to previous similar studies in other settings. The sixth and last chapter 
provides concluding remarks for the study. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the outline of the study  
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2 Theoretical Perspective and Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides the theoretical views about the topic by going through selected 
literatures that can be related with RoSCAs in one way or the other.  
 
2.1 RoSCA defined 
 
Different scholars gave their own definition for RoSCAs. Geertz (1962), describe RoSCAs as 
mechanisms by which traditional social relations are mobilized to carry out nontraditional 
economic functions. It is an institution aimed at goal directed and planned savings yet fits into 
the pattern of the community (ibid; Gugerty, 2007). Geertz (1962) further stated that 
RoSCAs, like agricultural cooperatives, are intermediary institutions by which familiar 
motivations are mobilized and applied for unfamiliar purposes. It is just a product developed 
when a society start to shift to a fluid commercialization from traditional agrarianism. 
 
Institutions established based on the motivation of members to provide good or service to 
themselves do have qualities and assets that cannot be claimed by other kinds of 
organizations. These include self-initiative of members, reduced need for public regulation 
(DeFourney, 1992 cited in Wickremarachchi, 2003; Bouman, 1994), and sensitivity of the 
services or products to the local needs (DeFourney, 1992 cited in Wickremarachchi, 2003).  
 
2.2 Characteristics, structure, and types of RoSCA 
 
From the definition of RoSCAs, it is possible to draw some attributes that could differ from 
one RoSCA to the other. The following are the major attributes of RoSCAs 
 
Membership: The number of participants in a given cycle of RoSCA could range from 
handful to several hundred (Ardener, 1964). However, the number of members and incentives 
to participate are believed to have a negative correlation. This is because people may perceive 
that the monetary value of participation and the value of their individual voice will be 
insignificant as the number of members increase (Birchall and Simmons, 2004; Jones, et al., 
2009). Members could be selected based on age, ethnic affiliation, occupation, religion or 
educational background or any given social tie (Sandsör, 2010). Sometimes it is not strange to 
find RoSCAS established based on political affiliation (Ardener, 1964).  
 
Contribution:  The contribution of members, sometimes known as hands or shares, could be 
in the form of cash or kind or a combination (ibid). In some instances, for example in Japan 
(Embree, 1946, cited in Ardener, 1964), kind contributions are considered in the same way as 
cash.  
 
Transferability: The funds in a given RoSCA could be or could not be transferable. The 
transferability depends on the agreement and consent of the RoSCA members at the time of 
establishment or in due course. 
 
The fund: Despite the fact that all members contribute fixed and equal amount throughout the 
life of a given RoSCA cycle, the advantages that members enjoy are not equal. At some point 
in a given cycle, all members will switch from a position of net saving to net debtor except the 
one who collects the pot at the beginning of the cycle that will make him a net debtor in the 
whole life of the cycle (Callier cited in Dejene, 1993). In other words, “all members but the 
last to receive the fund get interest free loans of decreasing magnitude for decreasing periods, 
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and all but the first give interest free loans of increasing magnitude” (Ardener, 1964:211). 
This term pot is used in this research to refer this fund.  
 
Enforcing mechanism: different enforcing mechanisms are being used depending on the base 
by which the RoSCA is established. If it is established based on kinship, acknowledged social 
relations among relatives could be used as default prevention mechanism (Fei, 1939 cited in 
Ardener, 1964). In Japan, to have an unpaid debt in RoSCA is very dishonorable among the 
community although there is no as such a dishonorable feeling in debt in general (Embree, 
1946 cited in Ardener, 1964). This shows that the relationship between members of a given 
RoSCA and the social setting among members is a critical factor as an enforcing mechanism. 
Even if there is a possibility of excluding defecting members from future RoCSA cycles as a 
mechanism for enforcement, Anderson et al., (2009) argue that RoSCAs could never be 
sustainable unless there is an external or social sanctioning mechanism.  
 
Types of RoSCA 
 
According to Anderson et al., (2003) the organizational structure of RoSCAs or the allocation 
of pots among participants do have a relationship with welfare, sustainability as well as 
enforcing mechanisms used in the institution. They argue that the organizational structure of 
RoSCA itself can be designed so as to address enforcement issues. Based on the pot 
allocations system different authors have classified RoSCAs into bidding, random (Sandsör, 
2010; Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008; Besley et al., 1994; Ambech and Treich, 2003); 
fixed or pre deterministic (Sandsör, 2010; Ambech and Treich, 2003); and decision RoSCA 
(Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008). 
 
The bidding RoSCA is characterized by the allocation of pots in a bid format. The winner of 
the pot at a given period of a life cycle is determined based on bid by which the one who 
offers the highest bid will win. Bids could be made at the beginning for the whole life of the 
cycle or at the beginning of each period in the cycle (Sandsör, 2010; Dagnelie and Lemay-
Boucher, 2008). “The individual who receives the pot in the present period does so by 
bidding the most in the form of a pledge of higher future contributions to the RoSCA or a 
onetime side payment to the other RoSCA members. The bidding process merely establishes a 
priority, everyone will take the pot only once” (Besley et al., 1994:702). The bid could take a 
premium or a discount format (Bouman, 1995). Bouman (1995) also discusses about a 
complex bidding RoSCA operating in West Africa, where a second fund with auxiliary credit 
is established with the money found from bidding. This will help to satisfy the demand of 
more than one participant at one period of a given cycle. 
  
In a random RoSCA, members put a fixed amount of money into a pot periodically and then 
pots will be allocated randomly to one of the members (Besley et al., 1994). A lottery could 
be drawn to choose the pot winner to stick with the norm of fairness in the institution 
(Sandsör, 2010). All participants will have equal opportunity of winning a pot at any time in 
the cycle of the pot. The next draw of the pot will exclude the winners of the previous pot/s 
(Besley et al., 1994). If the life of the RoSCA continues with another cycle, then a new 
random set up will be arranged. 
 
In the third type of RoSCA, fixed or pre-deterministic one, the organization as well as rotation 
system is the same as the random RoSCAs. The only difference in this case is that the pot 
allocation order will be the same as the first life cycle if the life of the RoSCA will be 
continued with the start of another cycle (Sandsör, 2010; Ambech and Treich, 2003).  
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The fourth type of RoSCA identified by Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher (2008) is a decision 
RoSCA. In this arrangement the pot will be allocated based on the decision imposed by the 
administrative body.  
 
Given all those choices, how should participants choose the best organizational structure for 
their group then? Sandsör (2010) suggests that groups that face enforcement problems may 
choose to establish the fixed RoSCA. On the other hand, as the concern for default reduces 
the more the chance to choose a random RoSCA. The incentive for default is higher in 
bidding RoSCAs and hence the members have to be more certain to prevent default using 
some sort of mechanism. 
 
It might not be comprhensive to summarize and categorize RoSCAs merely into the four 
kinds identified so far. This is because, as Geertz (1962) notes, the structure and operation is 
changing from time to time with different tendencies in different place. For example, in Asia 
the leaning is towards the creation of complex methods to calculate the interest payments and 
the way those payments are going to be distributed among participants. In Africa, however, 
the change is towards the leadership pattern as well as internal organization leading to 
administrative cost increment.  
 
2.3 Saving strategies reviewed 
The importance of money is equal to those who have and who don’t have it (Rutherford, n.d). 
If an individual spends all the money s/he has in a given period and still wants to purchase or 
consume something, s/he will face three options; to go without it until the next income, sell 
some asset and purchase what is needed, or find some way to tap into past or future income. 
Naturally, the third choice is preferable and it will be possible using financial services. 
 
According to Rutherford (n.d), financial services exist to help individuals to manage their 
savings. The help could be in two forms. The first is by providing access to the past incomes 
stored in different saving forms. Secondly, financial institutions offer lending services against 
a saving an individual plan to make in the future. A saving strategy, thus, could take three 
forms. 
i. Saving up strategy: is a strategy where an individual puts a sequence of savings and 
accumulate money into a large sum enough for serving some needed expenditure. 
Graphically, the saving is expressed as follows: 
 
     Figure 2: Saving up strategy (Rutherford, n.d: page 2.) 
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ii. Saving down strategy: this strategy is related to borrowing and repaying loan. The 
repaying capacity in saving down strategy is dependent on the act of saving just like the 
saving up strategy does. The basic difference in saving up and saving down strategy is that 
the availability of the lump sum money before the savings in the latter while it will be 
ready after in the former. “The savings, of course, are used as repayments on the loan—
either in intervals as income is realized or after a secondary process of saving up until 
enough has been accumulated to pay off the loan in a single balloon repayment” 
(Rutherford, n.d: 2). Figure 3 presents the saving down strategy. 
 
               Figure 3: Saving down strategy (Rutherford, n.d: page 2.) 
 
iii. Saving through: this strategy is a mix of the saving down and saving up strategies. The lump 
sum money becomes accessible at some point in a series of savings. Insurance coverages can 
be good examples of a saving through strategy. For example, in an insurance coverage for a car 
accident, saving is continuously performed in a series of payments and the lump sum will be 
available when the accident actually occurs. The strategy is presented diagrammatically in 
figure 4.  
 
 
            Figure 4: Saving through strategy (Rutherford, n.d: page 2.) 
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2.4 New Institutional Economics (NIE), Transaction Cost Theory 
and RoSCAs 
 
The economic logic behind RoSCAs can be approached from two ways: the traditional one 
that analyses RoSCAs from the financial intermediation framework (the logic of the market) 
and the new one that looks from the collective action logic (Dejene, 1993).  
 
In classical economics, Adam Smith explains that specialization determines the productivity 
of the economic system. Specialization could however be realized when there is an exchange 
which involves its own expense - a transaction cost (Coase, 1998). The lower the transaction 
cost the more specialization or division of labor and then productivity in the economy. But the 
transaction cost or the cost of exchange is dependent on the existing institutions including the 
legal, political, education as well as social systems. This is a point of departure for NIE – the 
performance of a given economy is governed by the institutions in the system (ibid). 
 
The concept of efficient markets in neoclassical economics works only when the transaction 
cost is zero. If there is a transaction cost, then institutions matter. That is why NIE argues that 
institutions really matter in the world where much of the national income goes to transaction 
costs. Thus, what the new institutional approach adds to the neo classical theory is that it 
incorporates institutions as critical constraint in the system and then analyses transaction cost 
as a connection between institutions (North, 1995). 
 
The formation of institutions is underlined by the cost of transaction which in turn is 
determined by the level of information completeness and the limited capacity of human 
beings to process the information. To cite him, “the costs of transacting arise because 
information is costly and asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange. The costs of 
measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or services exchanged or of the 
performance of agents, and the costs of enforcing agreements determine transaction costs” 
(North, 1995:2). Therefore, human beings build institutions to reduce uncertainty in the 
exchange process. 
 
The individuals and organizations with bargaining power as a result of the institutional 
framework have a crucial stake in perpetuating the system. In game theory, the probability of 
getting a cooperative solution will be higher when the players repeat the game many times 
which will help them get complete information about the performance of the other players. If 
the players do not repeat the game, then the gain form cooperation will be outweighed by the 
gain from defection (ibid). Thus, it is this repetitive nature of RoSCAs that renders it a low 
default rate as well as low cost of exchange (Gugerty, 2007). 
 
Institutions are composed of “formal rules, informal norms and the enforcement 
characteristics of both” (North, 1995). And it is the mix of these three that determines the 
economic performance (Ibid). Sandsör (2010) argues that RoSCAs are characterized by low 
transaction costs including low traveling cost and distance as well as low bureaucratic 
procedures as compared to the formal financial sector.    
 
Geertz (1962) has also stated that RoSCAs are institutions that are features of a society under 
transformation from agrarian to commercial one.  Hence, they are institutions in the “middle 
rung” of development and they are institutions by which tensions in the transformation 
process are going to be resolved.  
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Ardener (1964) compares the advantage of joining RoSCAs than becoming a customer of 
banks or private money lenders. RoSCAs are able to provide small scale credits that banks are 
not interested in. For the banks, it is not easy to assess the reliability of new customers if s/he 
requests new loan. The RoSCA organizers are in a more favorable condition to do that which 
will make the transaction cost much less. This could be explained by the term “information 
asymmetry” in economics (Hansmann, 1999). In the case of money lenders, the interest rate is 
very high sometimes more than 100%. In the RoSCAs, however, it is very low in case it 
exists. The justification behind could be the low risk of default in RoSCAS since the social 
enforcement mechanisms are very strong which make participants hesitant for a long period 
before they raise their reputation in the community. This keeps the transaction cost very low. 
 
Ownership can be used as a mechanism to mitigate some costs that could be incurred in the 
process of transactions if they were managed using simple market contracting. In the presence 
of market failures, especially, costs of market contracting will be very high. The market 
failures could be reflected by, for example, monopoly control in the market or information 
disparity among contracting parties, transaction cost of enforcing, monitoring and negotiating 
contracts (Coase, 1937 cited on Österloh et al., 2002). The advantage of ownership is, thus, 
eliminating or at least reducing the conflict of interest between the contracting parties 
(Birchall and Simmons, 2004; Hansmann, 1999). Hence, in establishing a RoSAC, the 
members will own their own financial institution without the involvement of other parties. “In 
simple terms, when you are on both sides of a transaction, you can always trust the other 
party” (Hansmann: 1999: 390). 
 
Mauri (1987) identified low transaction and administrative cost as one of the reasons why 
people prefer to join equb in Ethiopia. In the Ethiopian case, one of the reasons for the higher 
transaction costs of customers of formal financial institutions is the long distance they need to 
travel to get a service (Dejene, 1993). Bouman (1995), counter argues the suggestion to 
formalize RoSCAs by stressing that it is the informal nature of RoSCAs that holds the 
operating cost and the bureaucracy minimum. This will then keep the transaction cost low in 
RoSCAs and attracts participants to join.    
 
2.5 Knowledge based approach and formation of RoSCA 
 
The main difference between the knowledge based view and the transaction cost model is on 
the content of motivation.  
 
The major theme in the knowledge based view is the process of generating dynamic 
capabilities in an organization since they are the most important intangible resources, which 
could also work for an institution like RoSCA. “These are knowledge assets that are based on 
firm specificity, social complexity and causal ambiguity, which cannot be reduced to 
individual skills” (Österloh et al., 2002:66). Firms are assembled based on the will and 
individual knowledge of its members to achieve coordination and cooperation so that the 
respective individual skill will create a good dynamic capability for the institution they built. 
The drawback of this theory is that its disability to consider social dilemma as a problem for 
the success and even establishment of the institution (ibid). Hence, for the knowledge based 
view, there is no conflict of interest among members over the institutions they establish. This 
assumption, however, is problematic. This is because some selfish individuals may want to 
take control and think themselves as the one who is the source of all the knowledge created in 
the institution and want to take a monopolistic position in the hierarchy (ibid).  
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2.6 Extrinsic vs intrinsic motivation and the crowding effect 
 
Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations are two concepts that we need to define here. With 
extrinsic motivation people satisfy their needs in a certain firm indirectly through 
compensation in monetary term. Thus, the coordination in the institution can be achieved by 
linking the monetary motive of participants with the goals of the institution. With intrinsic 
motivation, someone will undertake an activity for his or her immediate satisfaction and the 
motivation is self-sustained (Österloh et al., 2002). Intrinsic motivation could be directed to a 
“self-defined goal”, “an activity flow”, or “an obligation of personal and social norms for 
their own sake including benevolence, identity, norms of distributive fairness and procedural 
fairness” (ibid:64).    
 
Classifying motivations into intrinsic and extrinsic does not mean that they are mutually 
exclusive. There could always be a relationship between the two and that is what is called 
crowding effect. A crowding effect could be either a crowd in or crowd out effect. Whenever 
there is a “crowd-in effect” the relationship between the intrinsic and the extrinsic motivation 
will be positive. In this case, any external stimulant, for example in monetary terms, will help 
strengthen the intrinsic motivation. The reverse will be true in the case of crowd-out effect. 
Crowd-out effect can be realized only when the intrinsic motivation is very high in the first 
place (ibid). 
 
Now the question is how it is possible to balance intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Personal 
relationships are among the preconditions to establish psychological contracts that are based 
on emotional loyalties and are believed to raise the intrinsic motivation to cooperation. Firms 
or institutions can make intrinsic motivations to work better than the markets by using 
mechanisms that will promote personal relationships among participants. Thus, according to 
Österloh et al., (2002) both transaction cost economics and knowledge based views have 
overlooked the management of motivation as a critical factor for the distinctive competence 
that an organization or institution can possess. 
 
2.7 Contending hypothesis about what motivate people to join 
RoSCA 
 
Researchers have conducted a study on RoSCAs to come up with possible suggestions as to 
why individuals join those institutions. Suggestions given so far by previous researchers are 
summarized in this section as follows. 
  
2.7.1 RoSCA as a means to purchase durable goods 
 
RoSCAs as an institution will help to create Pareto improvement in a society where the 
capital market is fragmented (Dejene, 1993). The reduction in waiting time to buy a bulky 
asset is one of the areas where the Pareto improvement is reflected. Anderson et al., (2009) 
coin the term “early pot motive” as the motive of joining RoSCAs for the purchase of durable 
goods. This is because participants want to take the pot as early as possible if their need is to 
purchase an indivisible good so that they can use the durable good for long period. In their 
influential contribution, Besley et al., (1993) have shown that, on average, RoSCAs allow 
participants to have the benefit of their saving earlier than they could enjoy it if they save 
alone. As a result, individuals can buy the good sooner by participating to the RoSCA rather 
than by accumulating private savings.  
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While arguing against the “early pot motive”, Gugerty (2007) states that if the main motive of 
joining RoSCAs is saving for the purchase of indivisible goods, the person who will win the 
last pot will not be better off by joining RoSCA since he can save it at home. Thus, he will 
leave the RoSCA. Then, second to last person will become the last and he will decide the 
same thing since he will not be better off by taking the last pot. In such a way, no one will 
stay at the RoSCA at the end of the day. In addition, the study conducted by Gugerty (2007), 
shows that RoSCA participants favor divisible expenditures more than the indivisible ones. 
Thus, RoSCA could also be used as a consumption smoothing tool for participants (ibid; 
Ashraf et al., 2003). In the case of Ethiopia, Abera and Zeller (2009) conduct a study in rural 
Ethiopia about food security. They found that the Ethiopian RoSCA (equb) membership do 
have a positive correlation with food security and hence is useful for consumption smoothing 
since participants use it for the purchase of divisible goods for consumption purpose.   
 
2.7.2 RoSCA as insurance 
 
The “insurance motive” is the contending suggestion for the “early pot motive” suggestion. 
This suggestion stresses that RoSCA members do not necessarily want to take the pot early 
since they also join RoSCAs as insurance scheme (Söndsor, 2010). Ambech and Treich 
(2003), while discussing about the raison d'être of RoSCAs, argued that RoSCAs are often 
presented as a substitute to insurance, particularly in developing countries where markets for 
insurance are underdeveloped. Yet, this interpretation applies for bidding RoSCAs, but not for 
random or deterministic RoSCAs, in which the allocation process does respond to some 
individual specific shocks (Ibid; Gugerty, 2007; Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008; 
Söndsor, 2010).  Moreover, people that group together in a given RoSCA generally belong to 
the same village and have similar occupations and revenues. This is not really compatible 
with risk-sharing activities (Ambech and Treich, 2003).  
 
For Sandsör (2010), RoSCAs could be taken as insurance by members that do not receive the 
pot yet and suddenly need some money because of emergency. But this only works under a 
condition where other members are willing and the next pot winner is willing to switch the 
order. In addition, even if some aspect of insurance is found in RoSCAs, there is a very little 
chance of getting the insurance (in case there is any chance), once a person received the pot 
(Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008). 
 
Despite the fact that RoSCAs are unable to provide explicit insurance against idiosyncratic 
shocks, they can provide an implicit insurance by allowing delay or forgo payments for the 
participant in shock (Gugerty, 2007). The first way in which RoSCAs can offer implicit 
insurance is by allowing members to determine the pot allocation order based on their needs. 
In allocating the order based on negotiation, each participant gives his preferred turn to 
receive the pot with the justification behind and the group will decide the final order. The 
study conducted by Gugerty (2007) on Kenyan RoSCAs suggests that this kind of allocation 
mechanism is more common in more homogenous groups that are likely to have better 
information about each other. Ethnic homogeneity, blood relationship, and group size do have 
an impact on deciding allocation mechanism in the group while education status has a 
negative correlation with negotiated allocation mechanism. The second way of offering 
implicit insurance is provision of an option to exchange pot positions. This option, however, 
provides a limited insurance only for participants facing a shock before they receive the pot 
(Gugerty, 2007).  
 
Thirdly, RoSCAs can offer implicit insurance by allowing participants to temporarily defer 
payments or even to forgo some payments when they suffer a shock. However, this will not 
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help participants to enjoy high level of insurance because of limited time period of 
forgiveness. In a situation where the group do not allow deferred payments and if a member 
do not pay one or more payments before s/he collects the pot, the group has two options 
(Gugerty, 2007): either not to give him his pot until he pay all the payments or to give him 
back up to the extent he pays – Gugerty calls it a “tit for tat” strategy. The second strategy 
“economizes on the transaction costs of disciplining and sanctioning members and also 
avoids the unpleasant task of sanctioning a member who may be having difficulties at home” 
(Gugerty, 2007:29). In case of default after collecting pot, it is only on the other coming round 
that the RoSCA can influence the member by using the tit for tat strategy. The other option is 
putting a social pressure and/or sending delegates or bringing him/her in front of the members 
so that s/he can justify the reasons for failure to pay periodic contributions. 
 
The last way is side payments. The member who wins the pot at a given time may lend some 
money to another member outside the RoSCA – meaning without formal recognition of the 
other members in the institution. 
 
2.7.3 RoSCA and socio-cultural relations 
 
RoSCAs as social cohesion mechanism 
 
Beyond the friendship gain from RoSCAs, members can build their reputation and network in 
the community in addition to the benefit of getting information and economic benefit 
(Sandsör, 2010). Geertz (1962:260) states that, “RoSCA is a socializing mechanism, in that 
broad sense in which ‘socialization’ refers to not simply the process by which the child learn 
to be an adult, but the learning of any new patterns of behaviour which are of functional 
importance in a society, even by adults”. 
 
RoSCAs can also be used as a means to enhance social status (Aredner, 1964). The organizers 
sometimes use it as a means to gain status and to demonstrate their leadership power as well 
as their administrative ability. Participants, on the other hand, use it as a means to show their 
generosity by assisting the organizer. In the case of bidding RoSCAs, the person who wins the 
bid for a given pot may feel proud simply because he wins the other bidders for the same pot.  
 
RoSCAS as a Tool to Cope Social Pressure 
 
Ambec and Treich (2003), in their attempt to answer the question why people join RoSCAs 
given there is another option of financial agreement that “pareto-dominate” RoSCAs come up 
with the “social pressure model”. In the model they assume that individuals are not able to 
resist the day to day pressure from the society and hence they use RoSCAs as device to escape 
from pressures. Interestingly, they challenge the “durable /indivisible goods” model in a way 
that participants may end up with the purchase of durable goods with the pot but they did it 
because the question of divisibility will not be raised among relatives. Hence, the durable 
good hypothesis will finally lead to the “social pressure” hypothesis. 
 
Ambec and Treich (2003) continue by defining RoSCAs as stable financial agreements by 
which participants reduce their vulnerability to social pressure by reducing their future 
available income. They also argue that those financial agreements are best suited for an 
economy consisting of a society characterized by strong solidarity as well as redistribution 
norm.  In the case of rural Ethiopia, Dejene (1993) states that equb is not merely a business 
oriented institution rather it is an institution where mutual assistance is reflected at the time of 
difficulties.  
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For Bouman (1995), RoSCAs do have an illiquidity function for participants. Participants in 
fear of greedy relatives want to become illiquid and hence prefer to deliberately join RoSCAs 
as an escaping mechanism. This could be labelled as “pressure from the bottom”. From the 
other side, there are places where RoSCA contribution is recognized as obligatory by the 
society (Bouman, 1995). Since the pressure is from above we can say it is “a pressure from 
up”. 
 
Some individuals may join RoSCAs to get personal gains like economic benefits, social 
image, and reputation.  Some others may get motivated to join simply because they want to 
contribute for the collective good without expecting any personal gain in return (Jones et al., 
2009). Such kind of participation could be motivated by the individual’s feeling of 
belongingness to a certain group, perception of duty to participate, or a simple sense of 
community all related to the need for social security. If someone perceives that s/he does have 
a social obligation to participate in such organizations, then the pressure will be high in a 
place where the size of the community is smaller i.e size of community and pressure of 
perceived social obligation of an individual are inversely correlated. Study results cited by 
Jones et al., (2009) have proved concern for community is among the motivating factors for 
individuals to join financial cooperatives.  
 
2.7.4 RoSCA as a commitment device  
 
Another reason why people might want to join RoSCA and tie themselves with some kind of 
saving pattern is their knowledge about their procrastinating nature – the feeling of “I can 
start saving tomorrow, not today” (Sandsör, 2010). Thus, they need some kind of 
commitment device to cope up the procrastination difficulties. Here is the point of departure 
for Gugerty (2007) to develop the commitment device model as an alternative explanation for 
the question why people join RoSCAs. For Gugerty (2007), RoSCAs is a commitment 
mechanism for those individuals that do not have access to good commitment technologies. In 
the western world, specifically in the US, some modern commitment devices are observed 
like over paying taxes to collect the lump sum at the end of the year, and choose to open 
saving accounts that charge customers per withdrawal (Ashraf et al., 2003). 
 
According to Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher (2008), RoSCAs could be a commitment device 
to protect participants from two potential risk categories: internal threats, like present biased 
preferences; and external threats, like spouse pressure. The present biased effect is dependent 
on the personality of a given individual – whether s/he is a naive or sophisticated individual 
(O´Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Naive individuals are highly affected by the present biased 
effect. A sophisticated individual is very pessimistic about his/her behavior in the future while 
a naive individual think that s/he will behave in a way that s/he wants in the future. In the 
middle, there are partially naive individuals who know that they may over consume but they 
underestimate their weakness (Bryan et al., 2010).  
 
For a sophisticated individual, doing things later is always less attractive. “When costs are 
immediate, a person is always better off with sophisticated beliefs than with naive beliefs. 
Naiveté can lead you to repeatedly procrastinate an unpleasant activity under the incorrect 
belief that you will do it tomorrow, while sophistication means you know exactly how costly 
delay would be” (O´Donoghue and Rabin, 1999:105). In a situation where the reward is 
immediate, a person could be better off if he do have a naive belief. In anyways, individuals 
who are “sophisticated” will have the ground to establish a RoSCA that will help them to 
become committed for saving (Gugerty, 2007).   
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Several mechanisms to encourage commitment presented by the literature of psychology 
could fall in two categories: intra-personal and extra-personal (ibid). Behavior such as 
confiscating the temptation from making personal rules with self-governing conducts is 
included in the intrapersonal mechanisms. The extra personal mechanisms are about imposing 
some kind of social or physical imposition on the available future choices.  
 
Commitment mechanisms do have two important features: the deposit side features and the 
withdrawal side features (Ashraf et al., 2003). The deposit side features help individuals to 
make a regular periodic deposit to their saving accounts while the features on the withdrawal 
side discourage or deter withdrawals by the individual. 
 
Ashraf et al., 2003 point out some deposit side features that encourage commitment in the 
modern case where there are formal financial institutions. These includes: automatic 
transfers - help individuals to transfer their money from one kind of account to the other and 
is common in the USA. However these are non-binding commitment devices since 
individuals can stop the transfer at any time they want; Automatic reduction from paychecks 
– the case here is similar with the automatic transfer except that the money will be deducted 
from the individual even before it is credited to his/her account; Deadline for bonuses – this 
is an arrangement by which financial institutions organize a lottery ticket if individuals can 
save a certain minimum amount in a given month. The deadline may force or encourage 
individuals to save at least the minimum amount set by the institution; Automatic increase – 
this is a commitment made by individuals who expect windfall income or increment in the 
future to save a certain percentage before the increment actually happen; Deposit collectors -  
are effective but costly way of saving. One can argue that deposit collectors exist because 
they reduce transaction cost. Indeed the transaction cost is lower as compared to saving in a 
bank but it is costly as compared to saving at home. The commitment factor should be 
considered here instead.  
 
On the other hand there are devices used on the withdrawal side. These includes: Delayed 
withdrawals - a deliberate feature installed in the account of customers to delay the 
withdrawal process; Withdrawal fee – fixing a fee to withdrawal transactions only, customers 
might prefer to maintain the account without a transaction fee but self-motivated individuals 
who want a commitment device might use the service; Lock box – the individual deposit 
money in a box where the key of the box is under the custody of a bank and then either a bank 
staff will collect the money regularly from the box and deposit it to the saving account or the 
customer will take the box to the bank so that the assigned staff can open it and make the 
deposit to the customer account; restricted timing of withdrawal – time deposit is a classic 
example of commitment mechanisms to save money for a specific period of time. The interest 
rate offered by financial institutions is usually higher than the ordinary interest rate but can be 
considered as a commitment mechanism. It could take two formats, either saving a fixed 
amount for a specific period of time or opening a fixed time deposit account matured on a 
date when the deposit reaches a pre agreed amount; Restricted use (or targeted savings) – 
“Perhaps the most common and straightforward commitment savings feature is the restriction 
on the use of funds. To the extent that individuals want to save for particular purposes but 
have difficulty doing so with their normal savings account, a specially labeled account for 
that purpose in fact has the necessary influence to inspire increased savings toward that 
purpose” (Ashraf et al., 2003:8); Peer Monitoring – is another mechanism that will create a 
peer control among group members in both saving and withdrawals which makes it both a 
deposit and withdrawal side commitment mechanism.  
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2.7.5 RoSCA as intra-household conflict solving mechanism 
 
Anderson et al., (2003; 2009), in what they call “household conflict motive” argued that some 
individuals want to join RoSCAs because of an intra-household conflict between saving the 
money to purchase durable or indivisible goods and the need for immediate consumption. 
According to them, the household maximizes its joint utility under some budget constraint. 
Hence, a conflict could occur in a household as far as the budget allocation is concerned.  
Unlike men, who only care about consumption in a household, women are believed to be 
careful about both having durable goods and consumption in a household. Thus, women 
usually use RoSCAs as a mechanism to solve this household conflict (ibid). Sometimes, they 
even join RoSCAs without their husbands’ knowledge.  
 
Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher (2008), however, challenged the “household conflict motive” in 
their study in Benin. 40% of the sample groups in their study require spouse approval to 
become a member of the group. In addition, the majority of the groups that share the financial 
leftovers organize feasts and celebrations at the end of each cycle with the involvement of 
friends, relatives and neighbours of the participants. Gugerty (2007) strengthens this argument 
by mentioning the issue of secrecy in RoSCAs. Based on the organizational structure of many 
RoSCAs, Gugerty concludes that the primary objective of women members is not to hide 
money from their spouses. In addition, the spouses of participants will be aware of the 
involvement of their spouses’ participants since the monthly meetings will be held in the 
house of the pot receiver. Anderson et al., (2009), replied that it is ok if the husband knows 
the involvement of his spouse once she started to participate in RoSCA since he will spend it 
on indivisible item when she received the pot. Gugerty (2007) then continued with the 
argument and said if that is the case, the husband is using the participation of his wife as a 
commitment device. Many empirical evidences have also explained cases where husbands 
support the participations of their spouses in RoSCA. Thus, participation in RoSCA is a 
household strategy not a mechanism used to hide some funds away from husbands. Ashraf et 
al., (2003) have also stated that intra-household conflicts and allocation dilemmas may lead to 
the demand for some kind of commitment device.   
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3 Methods 
 
This chapter gives a summary of the methods used in the study including; the research 
purpose and approach, research design, data collection and analysis, sample selection and 
description, as well as validity of the study. 
 
3.1 Purpose and approach 
 
The purpose of this study falls under the explanatory category, where the purpose is to give an 
explanation about a phenomenon. The study also explains the situation in a form of causal 
relationship – what is the cause for member participation in equbs?   
 
3.2 Research design  
 
“Research design relates to the criteria that are employed when evaluating social research. It 
provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2008:31). A research 
design could be classified into five: experimental, cross sectional or survey, longitudinal, case 
study, and comparative design. This study employs cross sectional (survey) research design.  
 
For Saunders et al., (2007) survey design allows a researcher to collect a large data 
(quantitative data that could be analyzed quantitatively by using inferential statistics) from 
considerable population in a short period of time simultaneously and economically. The 
enablement to collect data from the samples simultaneously will help to make comparisons 
and examine relationships between variables and will impede the researcher from 
manipulating the variables under consideration. The survey design also gives a researcher the 
power to control the research process. Those recommendations fit for this study since the data 
collected is quantifiable, and the research approach is deductive involving a hypothesis 
testing.  
 
While all the above reasons reflect a growing body of evidence to support the efficacy of 
survey design, the approach is not without its critics. For example, Bryman (2008) mentions 
that it is difficult to be certain about the presence of causal relationship even if one discovers a 
relationship between variables. What one can say is the variables are related. In addition, the 
researcher should ensure the internal validity of the research since the abovementioned reason 
reduces the internal validity of cross sectional design. 
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
 
Data related to the reason why members join equbs was collected using a questionnaire and 
interviews. Questionnaires were distributed to ordinary members while interview was 
conducted with the organizers. In order to identify respondents, the researcher attended the 
meeting of most of the selected equbs. When the researcher was not able to attend the 
meeting, questionnaire was given to the officials so that they can distribute it to the members 
randomly. The equbs as a group had been chosen through the researcher’s social network 
based on their location, size and relevance to get the necessary information that the researcher 
intended to collect at the beginning.  
 
The questionnaire (see appendix II) has four parts. The first part includes questions related to 
demographic information of the respondent. Questions related to member’s preference of 
equb type, pot assignment as well as equb structure are embraced in the second part. The third 
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section entails questions regarding member’s attitude towards formal financial sector. Finally, 
affirmative questions asserting consistency of respondent’s answer as well as questions used 
to summarize the whole questionnaire are asked. Individuals who are literate filled the 
questionnaire by themselves. However, the researcher collects information using self-filled 
questionnaires from illiterate respondents. The questions asked in the questionnaire generally 
cover the following areas:  
 The reason/s why members join equbs 
 The reason/s why members prefer equbs to other options available 
 What substitutes equb if they have to stop taking part in one 
 
Individual respondents and the interviewed equb organizers or officials had been assured 
about the anonymity of their responses in the research as suggested by Flick et al., (2002). 
Based on his consent, however, the name of the interviewed microfinance official is 
mentioned in the research report.  
 
The Analysis consists of three existing flows of activity: data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing/verification (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The data collected using 
questionnaire is quantifiable. This quantifiable data was organized systematically and 
analyzed statistically with a statistical software SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences).  
 
 
3.4 Sample selection and description 
 
In order to ensure the replicablity of this research, the procedures that the researcher follows 
in collecting as well as analyzing the data is described as follows.  
 
As one of the objectives of this study is to investigate if there is a difference in motive of 
members of equb based on the location of the equbs (urban – rural dichotomy) the samples 
are taken from both urban and rural areas in Ethiopia. Equbs in Addis Ababa, the capital city, 
have been selected to get urban equb samples. Addis Ababa is selected because the city hosts 
different big markets like Mercato (the biggest open market in East Africa), Shiromeda and 
Shola which will help to get the largest equbs. The city also represents different group of 
people based on wealth, ethnicity, or social status which will help to get the real urban setting 
that could represent other urban areas of the country. 
 
The rural samples are taken in Amhara Regional State, North Wollo Administrative Zone, 
Meket Woreda where the researcher comes from and has a better knowledge about. He has 
also the language skill that helped him to communicate easily with the participants in the 
research. The researcher has also benefited from the social network he has in the area which 
facilitated access to find right persons that could provide the relevant information.  
 
In order to get the relevant information to achieve the other objective of the research 
(investigate if there is a motive difference based on the size of the equb), three categories of 
equb are identified in both rural and urban areas based on their size as large, medium and 
small. The larger equbs are equbs where the pot is collected weekly and the minimum 
contribution per person to the pot is 1,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB). Those equbs are usually 
dominated by traders. One member can contribute more than one full contribution which will 
enable him to win the pot as much as the number of full contributions he made. 
 
In medium size equbs the pot is collected and distributed to the winner every month. A full 
monthly contribution per person to the pot is between 500 ETB to 1000 ETB. Mostly, 
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medium equbs are organized by civil servants or individuals with monthly regular income. 
Like the big equbs, one member can contribute more than one full contribution. The small 
equbs are equbs where the contribution per month per member is less than 500 ETB. The pot 
could either be allocated on monthly or weekly basis. Those small equbs are usually 
organized by those individuals, unlike the civil servants or the traders, who do not have a 
regular income on monthly or weekly basis. The members of the small equbs in this research 
consists of farmers, weavers, house wives, local beer (known as tela) sellers and small scale 
retailers.  
 
The following are the selected equbs.  
 
Urban equbs in Addis Ababa 
 
 Big equbs 
 
 Traders’ equb in Shiromeda area – this equb is found in a market locally known as 
shiromeda. The market is a center for traditional clothes, ornaments and gift items. 
This equb, established in 1994, operates with a written agreement (see appendix 
IV). It consists of 62 members and the pot is collected every week. If an individual 
contributes a full pot, s/he must pay 2500 ETB per week. Thus, a winner in a given 
week gains a total of 155,000 ETB. In addition to the weekly contribution, every 
member pays 10 ETB to cover the entertainment expenses during the weekly 
meeting. The pot is assigned based on lottery and sale. For the first ten weeks, 
contribution from every member will be deposited and not distributed to any 
member. At the tenth week, 5 lotteries will be drawn and 5 of the pots will be sold 
at a pre-determined price. Then, lottery will be drawn for pots every other week and 
the other pots will be assigned based on sale. The revenue from the sale will be 
deposited and will finally be distributed back to the members at the end of the equb 
cycle.  
 
Whenever a new cycle begins, every member is expected to sign on a new 
agreement approved by all members. Selling a pot to another member is possible 
based on the consent of the buyer and the seller. The equb officials are responsible 
for the preparation and application of the agreement. For this duty, they get one pot 
for every cycle as compensation. 8 questionnaires have been distributed for 
members randomly and 5 of them has been filled out and returned.   
 
 Traders’ equb in Ehil Berenda area – this equb is found in Mercato. The place, ehil 
berenda (literally mean cereal corner), is a center for cereal trade. The equb 
selected for this research was established in 2006 with a written agreement. The 
current cycle consists of 98 members. The contribution and assignment of pot is on 
weekly basis and the contribution is 2,000 ETB. Thus, the winner earns 196,000 
ETB at a time. The pot assignment in this equb is similar to the Shiromeda traders’ 
equb. Unlike the Shiromeda equb, however, the organizers in ehil berenda equb do 
not get compensated in cash. But they can take the first pots without a need to get 
into a lottery draw. 8 questionnaires have been distributed to the members 
randomly and 4 of them have been returned filled.    
 
 Traders’ equb in piassa area: this equb was established in 2003. The current cycle, 
which will run up to the end of June 2012, consists of 67 members. The pot is 
drawn every week and the minimum weekly contribution by a single member is 
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1,000 ETB.  Like the other two big equbs, 8 questionnaires have been distributed 
and 5 of them returned filled.  
 
 Medium equbs 
 
 Nile insurance main branch staffs equb: This equb is organized by the head office 
staffs of one of the insurance companies in Ethiopia – Nile Insurance. The equb is 
active since its establishment in 2007. The current cycle, expected to be completed 
in 6 months during the data was collected, has 10 members. The monthly 
contribution by each member is 500 ETB. Unlike the big equbs, there is no written 
agreement in this one. Five sample individuals have been chosen randomly to fill a 
questionnaire and all of the distributed questionnaires are returned. Samples from 
bank and insurance staff are consideeed purposely because those employees enjoy a 
credit scheme (both interest free and with interest) offered by their employer. But 
they still keep on joining equbs. 
 
 United bank Itegue Taytu branch staffs equb: every member in this equb is 
expected to contribute 500 ETB per month. The pot is assigned on monthly basis. 
The equb is operating since 2008. Currently, the number of participants is 8 and 
there is no written agreement to guide the day to day operation of the equb. Five 
questionnaires have been distributed for randomly selected members and all of 
them were returned filled. 
 
 Arat killo area computer typing and photocopy shop equb: the members of this 
equb, unlike the other medium size equbs selected for this study, are not employees 
in the same company. However, their working place is the same - Arat kilo area. 
The members are providing photocopy and computer type writing service for the 
students from Science Faculty of Addis Ababa University located on the other side 
of the road. The number of members in the current cycle is 13 with a weekly 
contribution of 150 ETB but the pot is assigned on monthly basis. Eight randomly 
selected members were asked to fill a questionnaire. Six of them returned the 
questionnaire. From the returned six questionnaires, one of them was not filled 
properly and hence discarded.  
 
 Kebele 05 equb (Janmeda area): This equb has been established 30 years ago. 
Currently, the equb has 31 active members. The weekly contribution in this equb is 
250 ETB. The pot is, however, assigned biweekly. Thus, a winner of a given pot 
will earn 15,500 ETB. The winner is assigned based on a lottery and auction basis 
for every other pot respectively. Unlike the other medium size equbs considered in 
this study, this equb has a written agreement. Four questionnaires have been 
distributed in this equb, and three of them have filled properly and returned. 
 
 Small equbs 
 
 Ferensay legasion tela sellers’ equb: this is an equb established by local beer 
(known as tela) brewers and sellers residing behind the French embassy in Addis 
Ababa. Members in this specific equb contribute 100 ETB monthly. Some of the 
members are also members of another equb where the pot assignment is on weekly 
basis. The current members are 12 and they don’t have a written agreement. 4 
members have been chosen randomly and fill the questionnaire. Since the members 
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that the researcher choses were illiterate, the questionnaires were self-filled by 
interviewing them.  
 
 Ferensay legasion tej bet equb: this is an equb collected in Tej Bet (a bar where 
another locally brewed alcohol known as Tej is being sold). Every member 
contributes to the pot 25 ETB weekly. In the current cycle of the equb 35 members 
are participating that will help the winner of the pot to earn 875 ETB. There is no 
written agreement to guide the operation of the equb. Like the samples form tella 
sellers’ equb, the questionnaires for this equb are self-filled since the respondents 
were illiterate. 3 samples have been selected from this equb. 
 
 Womens equb in 05 kebele of Ferensay legasion: Established by women residing 
around 05 kebele of Ferensay Legasion in Addis Ababa, this equb does not involve 
a written agreement. Each member is expected to contribute 100 ETB per month. 
The pot is assigned based on the demand of members. If there is no demand, a 
lottery will be drawn. Unlike the above two small equbs considered, most of the 
members here are literate. Six questionnaires have been distributed to the members 
and three returned filled. 
 
 Ferensay legasion film rental house equb: the last group of small urban equbs has 
been chosen from this equb. The equb is contributed weekly whereby every 
member should contribute 100 ETB. Currently, there are 13 active members. 5 
questionnaires have been distributed to randomly chosen members where 3 of them 
has returned filled.  
Rural equbs in Meket 
 
 Big equbs 
 
 Filakit traders’ equb: this equb is operating in the area for over a decade. Since its 
establishment, the equb basically works on a written agreement. The equb is also 
registered in the woreda administrative office. By the time the questionnaires were 
distributed to the randomly selected members in the equb, the cycle was left with 
the last three pots. When the researcher visits them again to collect the last filled 
questionnaire, they were celebrating the completion of the cycle with a get together. 
The number of participants were 54 where by each member contributes at least 
1000 ETB for every pot assigned weekly. The pot is assigned in a lottery format. 
The winner of the next pot is revealed one week earlier. In addition to the weekly 
1,200 ETB contribution, every member should put 350 ETB weekly to the capital 
of the equb. The collected capital will be loaned out to members in need of loan 
with an interest rate of 3%. The winners of the last three pots will earn an interest in 
order to be compensated for the time they wait to get the pot. The last winner will 
get the higher interest payment. The equb capital will increase by the net amount 
from the monthly contribution, the interest earned from loan and the payment for 
the last three winners. A member who wants to cease his/her participation is 
eligible to take the capital he contributes and the interest earned proportionally. A 
total of 15 questionnaires were distributed to randomly selected members and 12 of 
them returned filled.  
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 Geregera traders equb: This equb is more or less similar with the Filakit traders’ 
equb except the number of participants here is six lower than its Filakit counterpart. 
Six questionnaires have been distributed and all returned filled. 
 
 Medium equbs 
 
 Meket Woreda Agricultural Office staffs equb: Established by employees of the 
Woreda Agricultural office without a written agreement, this equb has been active 
since 2008. There is no practice of selling pots though there is a possibility of 
changing pots if the winner and the other member in need can agree on changing 
pots. Currently there are 9 members participating in the equb each contributing 500 
ETB every month. If s/he wants, a member can pay two or more contributions to 
the pot and won as frequent as his/her contribution in the cycle. Eight 
questionnaires have been distributed in the equb and 5 of them were returned filled.  
 
 Meket Woreda Finance Office staffs equb: the operation of this equb is almost 
similar to the Agricultural office staffs’ equb except that there is a written 
agreement here. There are 11 active members here each contributing 500 ETB per 
month. 7 questionnaires have been distributed and 5 of them return filled. 
 
 Meket Woreda Education Bureau equb: the operation of this equb exactly 
resembles with the Agricultural office staffs’ equb. Out of five selected samples for 
the study, 3 questionnaires were filled out and returned. 
 
 Small equbs 
 
 St. Micheal equb: this is an equb established a decade ago. This equb is more 
religious focused. Currently the group consists of 39 members. The minimum 
weekly contribution by a member is 100 ETB. Given some members can made 
more than one contribution to the pot at a time, the average value of the pot is 5,000 
ETB. The pot is assigned based on lottery and auction (auction for every third pot). 
The income from the pot sales will be used to cover the entertainment expenses 
during the meeting of the group every week. At the beginning of each cycle, every 
member contributes 3 ETB in addition to the weekly contribution. This 3 ETB will 
be saved by the equb and be borrowed for a member in case of any emergency or 
needed for any other reason. An interest of 3% is calculated on the borrowed 
money and the money is expected to be returned at the end of the equb cycle with 
the interest accrued. The saved capital as well as the interest income, however, is 
not going to be re-distributed to members. Instead, they will give it St. Michael 
Church – located in the equb area. The equb involves a written agreement of four 
articles where the religious aspect of the equb is clearly articulated. Eight 
questionnaires were distributed and returned filled. 
 
 Farmers’ equb in Maserut: this equb is established by farmers residing in Maserut 
kebele of Meket Woreda Administration. Each member contributes 25 ETB 
weekly. Currently, the group has 18 active members. Thus, the winner of a given 
pot will get 450 ETB. Six questionnaires were distributed in this equb. Since most 
of the members in this equb are illiterate the data is collected from the samples 
using self-filled questionnaire.   
In addition to the data collected via questionnaire from members, an interview has been 
conducted with organizers of the considered equbs. To get additional information regarding 
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the motive of equb members, the researcher has also conducted an interview with the CEO of 
a microfinance institution (MFI) operating around the area. The institution is called Meket 
Microfinance Institutions. It has been established and operating in the area since 1998.  
 
3.5 Validity 
 
One of the most important criterions of research is its validity. Validity is concerned with the 
veracity of the conclusions that will be drawn from a piece of research. Validity could be seen 
from either externally or internally. External validity is about the generalizability of results of 
a given study beyond a specific research context (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
For a study to have internal validity the researcher has to be sure that what is being measured 
is what the researcher thinks they are observing.  
 
The two most important issues in assuring the external validity of a research are sample 
representativeness and “reactive arrangements in the research procedure” (ibid: 113). For 
Bryman (2008), the external validity in cross-sectional or survey design is typically strong 
when samples are collected randomly while the internal validity is weak in survey design. In 
order to make the study valid both internally and externally for this research, first 
representative equb groups were systematically chosen by considering the location, number of 
members, the age of the equb after classifying them based on their size. Once the sample equb 
group is chosen, respondents have been chosen randomly which will make the external 
validity strong. 
 
To strengthen the internal validity, different authors recommend the use of triangulation - the 
use of different data collection methods for the same study (Whittemore et al., 2001; 
Merriam, 1995). For this study, information is collected from respondents via questionnaire 
and interview with organizers of equbs. In addition to the information gained from the equb, 
an interview has been made with the CEO of a microfinance institution working in the area 
where sample equbs were taken to increase the validity of the results. 
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4 Data Presentation 
 
In this chapter, the empirical data collected will be presented. The chapter begins by 
describing the demographic composition of sample respondents. Then after the cross 
tabulation results from SPSS are exhibited. 
 
4.1 Demographic characteristics of samples 
 
A total of 121 questionnaires have been distributed. 91 (75.21%) have been returned filled 
while 1 (0.8%) questionnaire has been discarded since it was not filled properly by the 
respondent. 45(49.45%) of the returned questionnaires were filled by respondents from urban 
equbs whereas rural samples filled and return the rest 46 (50.55%) questionnaires. 
 
As far as gender is concerned, 70% (64) of respondents were males while the rest 30% (27) 
were females. 30 (33%), 30 (33%), 22 (24.2%), and 9 (9.9%) of the respondents are aged 20-
29, 30-39, 40-49, and above 50 years old respectively. The occupation of the respondents is 
represented in the pie chart as follows. 
                                                     
Figure 5: Respondents’ composition by occupation 
 
For the respondents in this research, their monthly equb contribution systematically increases 
in accordance with the income they earn. All of the respondents whose monthly income is 
below 1,000 ETB contribute less than 500 ETB per month for the equb they are part of. At the 
other end, most of the participants with an income more than 10,000 ETB contribute more 
than 4,000 ETB every month. These shows that equbs can be established by different 
individuals irrespective of their income as well as members can join the equb that fits their 
financial status.  
 
4.2 Cross tabulation results 
 
The data collected via questionnaire has been analyzed using the software SPSS. The outputs 
found are presented systematically as follows. 
 
4.2.1 Reasonable number of members in equb and length of a single cycle 
 
The number of members in a given equb at a given cycle is decided by the organizers and the 
members themselves. Depending on the number of members and their choice on the 
frequency of contribution, the duration of a given cycle is decided. The duration obviously 
will affect the time by which the late pot winners will get their money back. As the cycle 
duration gets longer, the chance for the money to be affected by inflation or time value of 
money will increase. Most of the medium size equb members (30 or 94%) prefer the number 
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of participants in a single cycle to be less than 20. The same is true for small size equb 
members. Those in the urban-small equbs prefer the number of members to be below 20 
(85%). In the rural-small equbs, all of the members want the equb cycle length to be below 
30. On the other hand, 27(85%) of the big equb members prefers to have more than 30 
members in the equb they are part of. The justification given by the big equb members for 
their preference is that the money collected in the pot will be higher when the number of 
participants is large. For the small and medium equb members, on the other hand, large 
number of participants means administrative problem as well as long cycle time. 
 
The preference for equb length by members is related with the number of participants they 
want to have in the group. The urban-big equb members prefer an equb cycle length between 
1 and 2 years. The rural-small equbs, to the contrary, prefers a cycle length not more than 6 
months. The medium size equb members (both urban and rural) mostly prefer a time span 
between 6 months and 1 year. This is reflected by the choice of 23 (72%) of the respondents 
from medium size equbs.  
 
4.2.2 Time preference to take the pot 
 
The first question asked to respondents in relation to their equb participation was about their 
time preference to take the pot. Accordingly, 23 (72%) of the 32 respondents from big equbs 
want to take the pot at the beginning of the cycle. It is only one (3%) of them who stated that 
they want to take the pot at the end. The justification given by the respondents to take the 
money early is that they want to work with the collected money (the pot) with small interest 
or buying expense, if any. According to them they can repay the equb contribution after they 
won the pot by utilizing the money. To the contrary, most of the respondents (85%) from 
small size urban equbs want to take the pot at the end of the cycle. This is because, according 
to the respondents, they want to save the money. For the medium size equbs (both in urban 
and rural areas), the response is fairly distributed between the choices. 11 (34.4%) wants to 
take the pot in the middle, 7 (21.8%) want to win the pot at the end, 6(18.8%) prefers to win 
the pot at the beginning, while the rest 8 (25%) do not care about when they are going to win 
the pot. The response is summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Members time preference to take a pot in equb 
Equb type 
time preference to take 
Total at the beginning in the middle at the end i dont care 
frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age 
Urban - big 10 71.4 4 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 14 
Urban - medium 3 16.7 5 27.8 5 27.8 5 27.8 18 
Urban - Small 1 7.7 1 7.7 11 84.6 0 0.0 13 
Rural - big 13 72.2 3 16.7 1 5.6 1 5.6 18 
Rural - medium 3 21.4 6 42.9 2 14.3 3 21.4 14 
Rural - small 7 50.0 4 28.6 2 14.3 1 7.1 14 
Total 37 40.7 23 25.3 21 23.1 10 11.0 91 
 
4.2.3 Preference to organize a new or join an established equb 
 
Despite the fact that equbs are established by the willingness of all members, some 
individuals should take the initiative for the establishment. In some equbs – especially the big 
ones – the organizers get a financial benefit for the initiative and the control of the established 
  26 
 
 
equb. But 74% of the respondents simply want to join an established equb in spite of the 
benefit they may get by becoming an organizer. Equbs could be established based on a written 
agreement or without a written agreement. From the total 17 sample equbs chosen for the 
survey, all of the big equbs, 2 of the medium size equbs and 1 of the small size equbs operates 
under a written agreement whereas the rest do not involve a written agreement. This shows 
that most of the medium and small size equbs does not have a written agreement. However, 
most of the respondents prefer to organize (26.4%) or join (51.6%) equb based on a written 
agreement.  
 
4.2.4 What kind of pot assignment do members need? 
 
Equbs could be assigned based on lottery, based on periodic preference of members to take or 
on auction basis. In most of the equbs covered in this research, the pot is assigned in a lottery 
format. From the total 91 respondents, 49 (54%) want to have the lottery kind of assignment 
in their equb. In small equbs (both in urban and rural), 16 (60%) respondents want the pot 
assignment to be based on the need of the members i.e the pot should be given to a member 
who want the money urgently during the pot assignment time. From table 2 we can infer that 
choice of pot assignment method is different depending on the equb size irrespective of the 
location – urban or rural.  
 
 
Table 2: Members’ preference of assignment method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the pot assignment method is agreed between members, then the next task is to decide 
whether all the pots should be assigned once at the beginning of every cycle or every single 
pot should be assigned periodically. Many of the respondents in small equbs (70.4%) prefer 
the pot to be assigned periodically and only 2 (7%) of them want the whole pot to be assigned 
at the beginning of every cycle. In the big size equbs, however, half of the respondents want it 
to be assigned at the beginning and the rest want it to be assigned periodically.  
 
4.2.5 Time value of money and interest calculation in equb 
 
One of the most important points raised on the operation of equbs is the issue of time value of 
money and interest calculation. 23 (85%) of the respondents in small equbs have never 
thought about the time value of money they contribute to equb. On the other hand, members 
in the big equbs covered in this study are somehow concerned with the time value of money. 
19 (60%) of them stated that they think about the value of their money during the given cycle 
of equb they are part of. When it comes to the medium size equbs, almost half of the 
respondents (15 or 47%) have never thought about the time value of money. In total, 51 
(56%) of the respondents have never thought about time value of money in equb while the 
Equb Type 
Which assignment method do you prefer 
Total 
assignment on 
lottery basis 
assignment based on 
members preference i dont care 
Urban - big 11 3 0 14 
Urban - medium 11 7 0 18 
Urban - small 4 6 3 13 
Rural - big 11 6 1 18 
Rural - medium 8 5 1 14 
Rural - small 4 10 0 14 
Total 49 37 5 91 
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rest 40 (44%) think about it. The following graph shows the response given by the 
respondents for the question “have you ever thought about time value of money while joining 
equb?” 
 
                
Figure 6: Have members’ ever thought about time value of money in equb or not? 
 
Interestingly, among the 40 respondents who had thought about time value of money in equb, 
22 (55%) do not want the introduction of interest calculation in their equb. Even in the urban-
large equbs where large amount of money is mobilized, it is only 3 (21%) of the respondents 
who want interest to be calculated for the money circulated in their equb. The largest number 
of respondents who agree with the activation of interest in an equb are from the rural-big 
equbs where 16 (89%) of the samples supports the idea. 84% and 70% of the medium and 
small size equb members respectively do not support the introduction of interest to their equb.  
 
The reason given by those who do not support the introduction of interest includes: equb is 
just an institution based on friendship and cooperation since no need of having interest (20 or 
38%); 13 (22%) said if interest is calculated it will look like “Arata” (Arata is a term used to 
describe a loan offered by individuals who charge a very high interest rate for the loan they 
disburse); 10 of them said interest should not be calculated since there is no money deposited 
in the equb it will instead circulate or rotate among members; 4 of them stated that members 
may leave if interest is going to be fixed; and two of them said it is not allowed in religion. 
We don’t know the procedure, it will make the process complex, the money we contribute is 
not huge, equb money is a simple saving – not fair to calculate interest, and it will bring 
administrative cost and corruption in equb, are other reasons justified by one respondent each. 
The following pie chart summarizes the justification given by members for challenging the 
introduction of interest on the money circulated in equb. 
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Figure 7:  Justification given for challenging the introduction of interest in equb 
 
Those who support the idea of calculating interest in equb on the other hand mention that 
calculating interest in equb will make everyone in the group better off. They stated that late 
winners will be compensated for the inflation and their contribution to early winners. Some of 
them (7 or 22%) have also said it would help to increase the capital and develop the equb one 
step further. One respondent mentioned the risk involved in equb and indicated that interest 
should be calculated to cover the risk a member assumed because of the other. 
 
4.2.6 Discussion with spouse before joining equb 
 
This question is raised to see if equb members use the institution as a means to hide money or 
asset from their spouse. Of the 60 married respondents 56 (93%) said that they discuss with 
their spouse when they join equb. From the 4 respondents who does not actually discuss with 
their spouses, 3 of them were from small equbs. In relation to their gender composition, 3 of 
them were male and 1 was female. 
 
The reason given by 3 of those respondents who said no was that the money they contribute to 
equb is very small amount. Therefore, according to them, there is no need of discussing with 
their spouse. The other reason given by one respondent, and of course supported by the other 
3 as well, is that they will bring it back when they win a pot. Thus, it will be spend for the 
consumption of the household. Even if they don’t discuss it with their spouse, their spouses 
will informally know when they purchase something for the household. One respondent from 
urban-small equb said that: 
 
“I do not tell or discuss to my husband formally when I want to join equb. 
However, he knows that I am participating in equb in one way or another. I am not 
going to use the pot money for my personal consumption; it is for the household at 
the end. He even may have a chance to listen when my neighbors in the equb and I 
talk about the pot and the turn”. 
 
4.2.7 Member selection criteria 
 
Equbs could be established based on different criteria depending on the aim that members 
want to achieve. In order to know the preference of members regarding members’ 
composition in the group they are part of, a question has been raised by the researcher. 
Why dont you want the introduction of interest
in your equb?
equb is just about friendship and cooperation
the process will look like "arata"
there is no deposit involved in equb (money will rotate)
the sense of friendship will be lost
members may leave equb
becuase of religious reasons
it will be complicated
administrative cost & corruption will increase
equb is just a saving ‐ not fair to claculate interest
the money is not huge
we dont know the procedure
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Accordingly the respondents replied as follows: 29 (32%) prefers the other members should 
be found at the same income level and/or occupation; 12 said members should reside in the 
same area; 7 said they should be followers of the same religion; and 18 stated that they don’t 
care. 13 respondents said that they prefer other members to be from the same level of 
income/occupation and at the same time reside in the same area.  
 
Interestingly, the selection criteria differ from one equb to the other based on their size. From 
the 18 persons who don’t actually care about members’ composition, 10 of them are from big 
equbs. While justifying their position of not caring about the membership composition, they 
said that what matters is the level of worthiness to be member which is assessed by the equb 
officials. If the officials believe in the “trustworthiness” and if s/he is able to bring two 
guarantors from the equb when s/he took the pot money, then there is no worry about where 
s/he came from, what s/he do, or where s/he reside.  
 
When it comes to the middle size equbs, 14 (45%) prefers other equb members to be on the 
same income level and/or occupation. 5 (16%) other respondents from the same group prefers 
other members to be found at the same income level/occupation and reside in the same area. 
Access to information in relation to the day to day activities of other group members which 
will help to control the risk in the equb is the reason behind their selection criteria.  
 
On the other hand, 6 of the 7 respondents who mention religion as preferred criteria for other 
members are from small equbs (of which 5 of them are from rural-small equbs).  Here it is 
worth to mention the response from one rural-small equb regarding why he prefers other 
members to be from the same religious background: 
 
“…we have a meeting every week where we drink tela (local beer). At the end of 
every cycle, there is a feast and get together where we roast an ox and drink 
alcohols. Every equb member also contributes money to be given to the nearest 
church (St. Michael). Thus, if the member is going to be for example a Muslim how 
is he going to eat and drink with us? He will not be interested to contribute for the 
church as well…” 
 
 4.2.8 Willingness to change pot order, and perception towards “equb as a 
social obligation” 
 
According to previous studies conducted on RoSCAs, the institutions could be used as a 
mechanism to serve an individual’s social obligation in the community beyond his or her 
financial interest. The questions “have you ever thought participation in equb as a social 
obligation?” and “are you willing to change the order of the pot that you won to someone?” 
were asked to respondents in order to get the members attitude towards social obligation. 
Among the total respondents, 60 (66%) respond that they don’t really perceive equb 
participation as a social obligation. From the 31 respondents who perceive equb participation 
as a social obligation, 15 (48%) are from small size equbs. 12(86%) from rural-small equbs 
perceive it as a social obligation. If we consider the rural-urban dichotomy, 21(68%) of the 
respondents perceiving equb participation as a social obligation are from rural equbs.  
 
As far as members willingness to change the order of a pot (to change the pot they win to 
another member) is concerned, 80 (88%) said they were willing to do so while 9 (10%) said 
they were not. The justification they give for their willingness or unwillingness, however, 
differs from one kind of equb to the other. The following table summarizes the reason given 
by respondents. 
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Table 3: Justifications given by members to change or not to change a pot order they won 
 
Respons
e 
 
                              Justifications given 
                            Equb type and frequency 
Urban
-big 
Urban-
medium 
Urban
-small 
Rural-
big 
Rural-
medium 
Rural-
small 
 
 
Yes 
Equb is just a cooperation    2      --    --    1     1   2 
I will change but with a commission (charge)    3      --    --     8     --   -- 
If others have worst problem than me    2     16    9    7     7   6 
I want to be committed (take the money at the end)     --      2    1    --     --   -- 
If I don’t have a program with the money     --      --    --    --     6   6 
 
No 
I always want to use the money    7      --    --    1     --    -- 
I could have an arranged program    --      --    1    1     --    -- 
Neither We allocate pots based on need in our equb    --      --    2    --     --    -- 
 
As we can see from table 3 above, most of the respondents who said yes 47(59%) are willing 
to change if the person who requests to change have worst problem than them. But, the 
composition of the respondents differs based on the size of the equb. From the 47 
respondents, only 9 of them are from big size equbs. In the urban-big equb, 7 members are not 
willing to change from the beginning and 3 persons are willing to change but with a 
commission or charge (which in other words means sales). It is only 4 of them who are 
willing to change for free (2 of them set a requirement that the other members who request 
change have to have urgent problem than they have).  
 
In the rural big equbs, 16 (89%) of the 18 respondents are willing to change but half of them 
want a commission from the other member who want to change the pot. In the rural small 
equbs, to the contrary, all the samples taken are willing to change the order for free given that 
they don’t have a program and other members have worst problem than they have. The same 
is true for medium size equbs in both urban and rural areas.  
 
4.2.9 Collateral requirement in equb, what could replace equb  
 
In order to get a loan from formal institutions like banks and micro finance institutions, a 
physical asset is required as a guarantee or collateral. In all of the equbs considered for this 
study, physical collateral is not basically required to be a member or while taking the pot. 
However, in all the big equbs considered, a member should be able to bring two other 
members of the equb as a guarantee when s/he won a pot and going to take it. If the indivdiual 
is not able to bring “human collateral”, s/he will write a postdated bank cheque to the equb so 
that the equb can claim from his account in the bank in case s/he fails to pay his periodic 
contribution after s/he collect his/her pot. If s/he cannot do that either, then s/he will be asked 
to show a physical collateral. 
 
In all the medium and small size equbs considered, except one urban-medium and one rural-
small equbs, there is no need of showing either human or physical collateral. The equbs 
totally operate based on trust among each other. From the total 91 respondents, 9 of them had 
a chance to participate in equbs that requires physical collateral for members when they win a 
pot in the equb. But all of them said that they are not happy with that structure and finally left 
those equbs to join the equbs that they are part of now.   
 
“Let us assume that equbs cease to exist because of some reason. Then what else will 
substitute the institution for you?” was the next question asked to respondents. This question 
is asked to members because their choice of substitute institution could be an indicator for 
why they join equbs. Accordingly, 23 (25.3%) and 26 (28.6%) of the respondents said banks 
and microfinance institutions respectively. 36 (39.5%) of the respondents, on the other hand, 
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believed that nothing else can substitute equbs. Iddir and mahiber are considered as 
substitutes for equb by the rest 6 respondents. The composition of the responses varies based 
on the size of the equbs.  
 
If we consider the big equbs, 25 (78%) of the 32 respondents from big equbs said that they 
would consider banks and MFIs as a substitute for equb. The medium size equb samples also 
shares the idea of the big equb samples – 22(69%) choose banks and MFIs as a substitute. 
When it comes to the small equbs, nevertheless, it is only 7(26%) who think like their 
medium and big size equb counter parts. 18 (67%) of the members in small size equbs said 
that no institution could substitute equbs. The response about the possible substitute of equb 
for members is summarized in the following table. 
 
 
Table 4: Members’ choice of a substitute institution for equb 
Equb type 
             What will substitute equb for you?   
Total Bank  MFI Iddir Mahiber Nothing else 
freq. %age freq. %age freq. %age freq. %age freq. %age 
Urban-big 6 42.9 5 35.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 21.4 14 
Urban-medium 5 27.8 7 38.9 0 0.0 1 5.6 5 27.8 18 
Urban-small 3 23.1 1 7.7 1 7.7 0 0.0 8 61.5 13 
Rural-big 7 38.9 7 38.9 1 5.6 0 0.0 3 16.7 18 
Rural-medium 1 7.1 4 28.6 0 0.0 2 14.3 7 50.0 14 
Rural-small 1 7.1 2 14.3 0 0.0 1 7.1 10 71.4 14 
Total 23 25.3 26 28.6 2 2.2 4 4.40 36 39.6 91 
 
While the researcher was interviewing one of the organizers in the rural-small equbs, he said 
as follows: 
 
“…no institution can substitute equb for us. Of course, as we have said earlier, the 
religious dimension outweighs other motives in our equb. Most of us are here to meet 
every week and contribute to the St. Michael church. The income from sales of the 
equb as well as the interest earned will totally be given to the church. Last year we 
gave more than 18,000 ETB to the church and this year the deposited money to the 
church reached 9,000 ETB. We will give it to the church again when the current 
cycle ends…” 
 
And then the researcher asked him why they don’t change their equb into mahiber (which is 
totally a religious institution) instead if the religious motive outweighs in their equb. He 
replied: 
 
“It is a good question. If it is going to be a mahiber, every member will not be as 
committed as s/he is for the equb. In addition there are some members who want to 
be part of the religious activity and at the same time want the money since they are 
traders. Thus, in order to incorporate those members to the equb and to commit the 
other members we prefer equb than mahiber.”     
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4.2.10 Why do members choose to join equb while they can use formal 
institutions?  
 
The next question respondents have been asked was about why they keep on participating in 
equb while they can use formal institutions. For big urban equb members, using formal 
institutions is expensive and the procedure is long or uncomfortable for them. Except two of 
the 14 respondents the rest said that they use equbs because either it is expensive to get the 
service from formal institutions, or the procedure is too long, or they are not comfortable with 
the procedures, or there is no freedom to spend the money at the business they want to work 
on. Of the two respondents who justify out of the above listed reasons, one said that he keep 
on participating in equb because he have a good experience with equbs. The other one said 
that a bank loan will make him worry while equb money does not feel him so. In an interview 
conducted with big equb organizers one of the organizer stated that: 
 
“…let alone the expensive interest rate charged by banks and microfinance 
institutions, the procedure is lengthy. As business men we don’t want that. In addition, 
banks require physical collateral. Most of us do have a bank account but not a loan. 
The worst situation in equb is similar with the banking service for us which is saving 
the money until the last period. If a lottery is not drawn for you and you need the 
money urgently, you can buy from other members without any procedure and time 
wastage. If you cannot get it in either way, then you will finally get your money at the 
end which is similar to saving it into the bank…”  
 
For the small equb members, the major reason that keeps them on participating in equbs 
having the chance to be a customer of a formal institution is their good experience with equbs. 
16 of the 27 respondents confirmed that they kept on participating in equb because of their 
experience. 4 members said that it was expensive to use formal institutions. The rest said that 
it was not easy to get a loan from a formal institution while it was timely and easy to access 
fund from equb. Here it is worth to mention the words of the chairman of one of the smallest 
equbs considered for this study. He said that: 
 
“I am a customer of MFI, but at the same time I keep on participating in equb. In the 
MFI every activity is planned and there is a deadline for the repayment and if you 
fail to do so in the deadline, they will not compromise or wait you until you get 
money. They will take it to the court. Thus, I use my equb money as a backup for the 
repayment in case I fail to stick with the repayment deadline for MFI loan using my 
other income. I can even get a loan from an individual using my equb pot as a 
guarantee or collateral. Thus, I will never stop participating equb in spite of my 
involvement in deposit or credit transactions with MFIs.”  
 
The medium size equb members, on the other hand, mention that they will not be committed 
if they will deposit their money in formal institutions and the procedure is long as well. 6 
members stated that it is expensive to use formal institutions and 5 of the respondents said 
that they like the freedom of spending the equb money to whatever they want which they 
could not enjoy if they take a loan from formal institutions. The chairperson of a medium size 
equb explained in an interview conducted with her that: 
 
“…I am a government office staff. I receive my salary in cash and whenever I need to 
go to the formal institutions and perform a long process for a transaction, I should 
use my office time since they will be closed when I left my office at the end of my 
working hour. I cannot use my office time because I may clash with my boss. Thus, I 
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and my colleagues here prefer to establish equb. In addition it is also expensive to 
borrow from microfinance institutions and it is totally unthinkable to borrow small 
amount of money from banks. The equb will also make us committed to save”  
 
In order to see the view from the other side, the researcher conducted an interview with the 
CEO of a MFI operating in the area for the last ten years. According to him, his customers are 
sensitive to the processing time from the day of application to the date of disbursement even 
more than they are sensitive to the interest rates. “…when I discuss with the customers, they 
usually tell me that they prefer our institution because the processing time and the procedures 
are shorter in our company than our competitor” said the CEO, Mr Fantaye Moges.  
 
Mr. Fantaye has also stated that his company approached some equbs so that the members 
could become customers. However, most of them do not like the process in formal 
institutions.  
 
4.2.11 Discussion to transform equb into a formal institution 
 
The next question asked to respondents was regarding their intention about transforming their 
equb to a formal institution. Surprisingly, no respondent from the urban equbs mentioned that 
they had a discussion in their equb to transform their institution into a formal one. In the 
urban-small size equbs the reason for not considering the idea of transforming is lack of 
knowledge about how and to what to convert the institution having a very small amount of 
circulating money in the equb. To the urban-big and urban-medium equbs, nonetheless, the 
reason is different. In an interview with the organizers, one of the medium size equb 
organizers stated that: 
 
“…we don’t need the interference from other parties like the government in our equb 
in the day to day operation. If we are going to make it formal, we have to report the 
activities of the equb which we don’t want. In addition we will incur an 
administrative cost and set up a procedure like what the other formal institutions 
have. This will make equb costly…” 
 
An organizer of a big equb has also said: 
 
“….transforming to formal institution? Is it not easy to be a customer of an 
established bank than transforming our equb to a new formal institution like 
cooperative? Have you consider the establishment cost? What about the 
administrative cost? The money will be stacked somewhere for nothing if it is going 
to be formal. The operation is not going to be faster like equb. That is why we 
establish equb from the beginning.”   
 
In the rural equbs, however, members have made discussions with their colleagues on the 
possibility of transforming their equb into a formal one. This is supported by a confirmation 
from 22 respondents (14 from big, 3 from medium and 5 from small size equbs). In one of the 
rural-big equbs, members contribute 350 ETB every week in addition to their regular equb 
contribution. This money will be used to establish the equb capital and capacity of meeting 
the loan demand from its members. They have also a plan to form a share company where the 
owners are the equb members. One of the rural-small equb members has also started a 
discussion with the responsible Woreda officials about forming a saving and credit 
cooperative. But, interestingly, in both equbs, their interest is to operate the equb and the 
formal institution in parallel. Transforming for them doesn’t mean totally replacing/changing 
the equb into some other institution. Rather, it means, creating/forming another independent 
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big organization that can supplement/complement the equb by members, while maintaining 
the operation of the equb. 
 
4.3 Testing possible reasons to join equb 
 
At the final section of the questionnaire, reasons that could be justified for joining equbs were 
listed and respondents were asked to choose from options of agree, disagree, and indifferent 
for every question (see the questionnaire in the appendix). Their reply is summarized as 
follows. 
 
4.3.1 Lack of access to formal institutions and expensive to use them 
 
The first reason listed by the researcher as a cause for joining equbs was lack of access to 
formal financial institutions. From the 91 respondents, only 17 (18.7%) agreed that lack of 
access to formal financial institution could be a reason for them to join equbs. The majority of 
the respondents, 65 (71%), however, did not agree that lack of access to formal institutions is 
a cause for joining equb. The rest 9 individuals remained indifferent.  
 
Table 5: Respondents reply regarding access to formal institutions and expensive to use them as a reason to join 
Possible 
reason to join 
Option equb type 
Total Urban big Urban medium Urban small Rural big Rural medium rural small 
Lack of access 
to formal 
institution 
Agree 3 1 4 3 1 5 17
Indifferent 0 2 4 1 0 2 9
disagree 11 15 5 14 13 7 65
Total 14 18 13 18 14 14 91 
Expensive to 
use formal 
institutions 
agree 11 6 7 12 5 4 45
Indifferent 0 1 2 3 0 1 7
disagree 3 11 4 3 9 9 39
Total 14 18 13 18 14 14 91 
 
As it is depicted in table 5 above, most of the respondents disagree that lack of access to 
formal institution is a reason to join equb. Given 1 represents agreement, 2 represents 
indifference, and 3 represents disagreement, the mean for this variable is 2.53 which indicate 
that most of the responses are inclined towards disagreement. If we see the distribution of 
responses in different size equbs, 9 (53%) of the 17 respondents who agreed are from small 
size equbs. It is only 4 of the respondents from big equbs and 2 respondents from small size 
equbs who actually agreed with the first possible reason. The disagreed respondents are fairly 
distributed among the different equb types (size). 
 
When we look at the second possible reason to join equb, expensive to use formal institution, 
45 (49.5%), 7 (7.7%), and 39 (42.8%) of the respondents expressed their agreement, 
indifference and disagreement respectively. Even though it looks like that the number of 
agreed and disagreed respondents is almost proportional, the composition of respondents to 
each option is different. 23 (72%) of the 32 respondents from big equbs stated that it was 
expensive to use formal institutions and this was among their reasons to join equbs. Most of 
the members in medium size equbs, to the contrary, do not think that it is expensive to use 
formal institutions. This is supported by the disagreement of 20 (62.5%) of the respondents 
from middle size equbs. It is almost a half-half situation for the small size equbs. 
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4.3.2 Ashamed to use formal institution having small money to save or 
borrow 
 
From the total 91 respondents it is only 9 of them who said that they feel ashamed to go for 
formal institutions having small money to save or borrow. 78 (86%) of the respondents, 
however, disagreed that this could be a cause for joining equbs.  
 
4.3.3 Purchase of durable good 
 
According to some scholars like Gugerty (2007), the major reason for members to join 
RoSCAs is the need to purchase durable good. In order to taste this, the researcher raised this 
question to respondents. The response is summarized on the table below. 
 
Table 6: members’ response for the need to purchase durable good as a reason to join equb 
 Equb Type I joined equb because I want to purchase durable good 
Total agree indifferent disagree 
Urban - big 3 2 9 14 
Urban - medium 16 0 2 18 
Urban - Small 13 0 0 13 
Rural - big 5 1 12 18 
Rural - medium 10 1 3 14 
Rural - small 4 1 9 14 
Total 51 5 35 91 
 
From the above table one can infer that most of the medium size equb members, (26 or 81.3% 
of the total respondents) agreed that the need to purchase durable goods is among their motive 
to join equbs. To the big equbs, on the other hand, it looks like that this does not work. It is 
only 8 of the 32 respondents from big equbs who agreed that it could be the reason for their 
participation in equb. When it comes to the case of small equbs, 17 of the total 27 respondents 
agreed that one of their motives to join equb was emanated from the need to purchase durable 
good. This is especially true for the urban-small equbs where all of the 13 respondents 
confirmed it. 
 
4.3.4 “I consider it as insurance” 
 
The next question for the respondents is about whether they consider “equb as an insurance or 
not”. It is found that most of the respondents in rural equbs consider it as insurance but not the 
urban ones. Of the total 46 members considered in rural areas, 29 (63%) consider it as an 
insurance scheme while only 11 (24%) of the 45 respondents in urban areas do so. If we look 
at based on the size of equbs, it can be said that almost half of the respondents from each size 
agree and the rest half do not agree that equb could be considered as insurance. The following 
graph will help to compare the responses based on equb size and location. 
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Figure 8: Members’ perception of equb as insurance 
 
4.3.5 Considering equb as a social obligation, and fear of discrimination 
from equb organizers 
 
In spite of the involvement of money in the day to day operation of RoSCAs, some people 
may join the group simply because they feel that it is their social obligation to do so. In order 
to test this in equbs, the researcher includes a question about whether they consider social 
obligation as a motive to join.  
 
Table 7: Members’ perception of equb as a social obligation 
Type of equb I consider participation as a social obligation total 
Agree indifferent diagree 
Urban equbs 16 8 21 45 
Rural equbs 25 2 19 46 
Total 41 10 40 91 
 
More than half of the respondents from the rural equbs believe that participation in equb is a 
social obligation for them. But those in the urban equbs, especially in the big ones do not 
perceive equb participation as a social obligation like their rural counterparts. If we look at the 
composition of the 16 urban respondents who consider participation in equb as a social 
obligation, only 3 of them are from big equbs. Of the 25 rural respondents who agreed, 14 are 
from small size equbs which represents all samples in the group.  
 
When we see the response from size perspective, 20 (74%) of the 27 small size samples 
agreed that they perceive participation in equb as a social obligation. It is 10 of 32 
respondents from medium size as well as 10 of 32 respondents from big size equbs who 
ponder equb participation as a social obligation. 
 
Beyond the feeling that participation in equb is a social obligation, sometimes members may 
join a group simply because they afraid discrimination if they refuse to participate in an equb 
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organized by someone who they know. Respondents have been asked about whether they 
agree with this and it was only 6 of the 91 respondents who agreed. This shows that there is a 
less probability that members will join equb by being afraid of the discrimination to come 
from equb organizers in other activities in the future. 
 
4.3.5 Equb as a commitment mechanism 
 
In order to taste this, three questions has been included in the fourth section of the 
questionnaire (see annex II). “I cannot get the equb money unless it is my turn”, “cannot save 
money alone (I will spend it to purchase unnecessary items)”, and “cannot save money alone 
(I will spend it for family consumption)” were the three questions that respondents express 
their agreement and/or disagreement for.  
 
Of the total 27 samples from small size equbs, 23 (85%) agreed that they considered joining 
equb because they were not going to get the money they contributed in equb unless it was 
their turn to take the pot. In the big size equbs, to the contrary, the majority of the respondents 
(75%) disagreed. 15 (49%) and 11 (34%) respondents from medium size equbs agreed and 
disagreed respectively making it not possible to generalize for the medium size equbs in this 
regard.  
 
When the option “I joined equb because I cannot save alone at home since I will spend it to 
purchase unnecessary items” is raised, the majority (63%) of the medium size equb samples 
agreed with the reason so did 70% of the small size equb members. However, the majority of 
big size equb members (69%) disagreed unlike their small and medium size equb 
counterparts. 
 
The majority of medium and small size equb members, 56% from each, have also agreed that 
they cannot save alone at home since they may use it for family consumption. Nevertheless, 
69% of the big equb samples disagree when they asked that they joined equb because they 
cannot save alone at home since they may spend it for family consumption purpose.  
 
Most of the big equb members (53%), especially the big- rural equb members, stated that it is 
not because they cannot save money out of equb that they join the group rather it is to get 
strength by looking others members doing something using the pot money. This is also 
supported by medium and small size equbs as well (50% and 52% respectively).     
 
4.3.6 Equb as a habit 
 
For most of the small size equb members joining equb is a habit. Out of the total 27 
respondents, 15 (56%) agreed that it is a habit for them. This totally does not work for the big 
size equbs. 81% or 26 big size equb members do not agree that joining equb is a habit for 
them. The same is true for the medium size equbs where 72% do not agree that equb 
participation is a habit for them. 
 
4.3.7 Equb as a mechanism to escape from pressures of relatives 
 
One of the recently developed model by Ambec and Treich (2003) argued that people uses 
RoSCA as a means to escape from social pressure. In order to taste this to the equbs under 
study, members have been asked about their perception regarding equbs as a means to escape 
from pressure of relatives. Out of the total 91 respondents, it was only 10 (11%) who agreed 
with the idea. Of the 10 respondents who agreed, it was only two of them who were members 
  38 
 
 
of urban equbs. If we look at the composition based on size of equb, it is only 2, 1, and 7 
respondents from big, medium, and small size equbs respectively who agreed that pressure or 
fear from relatives will make them to join equbs. The following graph shows the responses in 
relation to the type of equb. 
    Figure 9: Members’ perception towards fear of pressure from relatives as a reason to join equb                          
 
In addition to the response from members regarding equb as a means to escape from relatives’ 
pressure, the equb organizers believed that equb could not be a means to escape from 
pressure. One of the interviewed equb organizers said that: 
 
“…I think equb could not serve that need of members. At some point in the equb 
cycle, the person will get the money. You can say I don’t have money for the time 
being since I have a payment for equb. But your relatives will come when they know 
that you won a pot and they may even need a large amount of money assuming that 
you won equb…”  
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5 Analysis and Discussion 
 
In this chapter the empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter will be analyzed. The 
word equb and RoSCA are used interchangeably in this chapter being the first used to refer 
an institution found in Ethiopia, and the second to similar institutions all over the world.  
 
5.1 Evaluating financial benefits or losses of joining equbs 
 
A participant in equb is expected to contribute a fixed periodic contribution from the 
beginning to the end of the equb cycle. Assuming that the individual will win the last pot 
(which is actually what the individual can be 100% sure about), s/he will end up with a saving 
equal to what s/he will contribute. This individual, however, have another risk free and easy 
option to put or save money. That is depositing it into a bank periodically. By doing so, he 
will also be able to get an interest income throughout the time that he keep the money in the 
bank. If he decided to contribute to equb, the benefit will be calculated depending on what he 
will do with the pot money he won from the equb. But, obviously, a purely financially 
motivated individual should calculate and compute the net amount of money that he can earn 
from both options and will decide either to join or not to join.  
 
The decision could be different for those who consider equb as a saving mechanism and those 
who consider it as a credit mechanism. In both cases, the individual should know the point at 
which he will be indifferent so that he can decide among the options that he has. Calculating 
the financial aspect here will help to understand the empirical findings better.  
 
5.1.1 Equb as a saving mechanism 
 
In this case the individual have two options that will help to generate income on the money 
while he is saving at the same time: either he will use bank or he will join equb.  
 
i. No involvement in equb, save it in a bank periodically 
This scenario is considered as a standard to compare the benefits or loses incurred by joining 
equb instead of using bank. This option is a risk free option as long as the individual keep on 
depositing the periodic payments. In this case, the total money that an individual will have at 
the end of the nth period can be calculated using the future value of annuity formula.  
                                           
                                         FVoa = PMT [((1 + i)n - 1) / i] 
 
                        Where, FVoa is the future value of annuity                                                                             
PMT is value of the periodic payment                                                                        
i is the periodic interest rate (annual interest / number of periods) 
                                     n is the number of periods for annuity contribution 
 
For our case we assume that the individual will save 2,000 ETB every week for 52 weeks or a 
year for all scenarios demonstrated below. Given a 5% annual interest rate (the prevailing 
bank saving interest rate in Ethiopia), the weekly interest rate will be calculated as 5%/52. 
Thus the Fv of money accumulated at the end of the 52nd week will be:   
= 2000 [((1 + (5%/52))52 - 1)/ (5%/52)]                                                               
= 106,591.35 ETB  
Of this value 104,000 (calculated as 52 * 2000) is the principal, making the interest income 
2,591.35 ETB. The formula can be modified to find only the interest income as follows:          
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                    Interest income from annuity = {PMT [((1 + i)n - 1) / i]} – (PMT*n) 
 
The periodically accumulated interest is depicted in the following graph. 
 
Figure 10: Interest to be gained under ordinary annuity saving in a bank for 52 weeks 
 
As it is shown in the graph, the accumulated interest will rise at a lower rate at the beginning 
and rises at higher rate later as the principal as well as compounded interest increases. The 
accumulated interest income will stand at 2,591.35 ETB at the end of the 52nd period. 
 
ii. Involvement in equb 
 
The same person can also join equb having the same amount of money to contribute. The 
person joins equb as if he will get the last pot since that is the point where he can be 100% 
sure about getting the pot (assuming there is no default by members). Thus, logically he can 
keep on contributing the 2,000 ETB periodic contributions irrespective of when he will 
actually get the pot. However, he may get the pot at the first period but he will contribute the 
periodic payment without touching the pot money he won. Now the question is what will he 
do with the pot money? The individual has two options:  
a) Deposit it in a bank immediately after he get the pot money at the bank interest rate – 
in  our case 5% 
b) Or invest it somewhere for which he can get a return above the average bank saving 
interest rate. 
 
a) Deposit it in a bank immediately after getting the pot: 
 
Here the individual uses both equb and bank. S/He will bring the pot money to deposit in a 
bank. The interest rate is the bank deposit interest rate. Once the individual deposited the 
money it is assumed that he will not withdraw it until the end of the equb cycle. For 
example, let us assume that the equb has 52 members where contribution is made weekly. 
If the individual get the pot at the third period, he will deposit it immediately and will not 
withdraw it until the end of the 52nd week while keep on paying the contribution to the 
equb.  
 
This individual joins equb instead of saving by his own in a bank. If we should calculate 
the financial benefit that the individual enjoys by joining equb, we should know the period 
that he will get the pot money. The financial benefit (interest income) he enjoyed differs 
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based on the period he gets the pot since the interest is dependent on the time that the 
money will stay in the bank. At the beginning of the cycle, however, the individual do not 
know when he will get it. Therefore, we should calculate the interest income for every 
possible period. At 5% interest rate compounded weekly, the individual’s interest income 
at the end of the 52nd period given the period where he get the pot money is depicted in the 
following graph. 
 
Figure 11: Interest income earned if the individual won in different periods and deposit it immediately in bank   
 
As it can be seen clearly from figure 11, the individual gain will be high if s/he wins and 
deposits the pot money in a bank in early period. If s/he wins the 1st pot and deposits it 
immediately, the interest income will be 5,224.54 ETB while s/he will not have an interest 
if s/he wins the last pot. Now we can compute when the individual will be better off 
financially if he joins equb instead of using the bank. What we should note here is that the 
gain from the bank if he don’t involve in equb is constant since his deposit is not affected 
by other parties involved. 
 
Figure 12: Point where the income from ordinary annuity and income from saving the pot money become equal  
 
From the above graph one can infer that a given equb participant will be financially better 
off if and only if he can win the pot at and before the middle period of the cycle. A chance 
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of getting the pot money at any period after the mid-point of the cycle will not make the 
individual financially better off as compared to saving in a bank. 
 
b) Invest the pot money somewhere else 
 
An individual always takes a risk when investing on a certain business. It is of course 
because of the risk taken that s/he expects a return rate more than the average bank saving 
interest rate. When it comes to managing pot money collected from equb, the individual 
has the option to invest it somewhere instead of saving it in a bank. In this case the 
expected income from investment will be higher than the expected income from an 
ordinary saving in a bank. The problem is the individual does not have a guarantee as to 
when he will get the pot. Therefore, we should calculate the expected financial benefits if 
the individual wins the pot at different stages of the equb cycle assuming a certain 
investment return rate. The financial gains are calculated below. By doing so we can easily 
see winning when will make the individual financially better off by joining equb than 
making an ordinary saving in a bank. 
 
 Assuming a return rate of 5%: the expected income in this case will be the same as the 
scenario in (a). But here we should also assume the interest will be paid on weekly 
basis. If not, the person will enjoy the interest at the end of the nth period in our case at 
the 52nd period. The incomes are represented in the following graphs. 
Figure 13: Interest to be gained by investing the pot money at 5% return rate (interest to be paid every week) 
 
As it can be seen from the graph, the individual will invest the pot money immediately 
after he received it and the investment will start generating return immediately. 
Assuming the interest will be paid weekly, the total gain at the end of the 52nd week at 
5% return rate is equal to the return to be gained by saving the pot money at 5% bank 
saving interest rate. The amount of interest to be gained would be a bit different had the 
investment return been paid only once a year (at the end of the year). The figure will be 
different, obviously, because of the compounding effect. However, it will not affect the 
equilibrium period that much where the gain from ordinary periodic saving in a bank 
(the case in i) and the gain from depositing the pot money will become equal.  The 
following graph shows the case where the return from investment is paid once a year.  
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Figure 14: Interest to be gained by investing the pot money at 5% return rate (interest to be paid once a year) 
 
In all cases (whether the investment return is paid weekly or once a year), the individual 
will be financially better off by joining equb if and only if he can get the pot at and 
before the mid-period of the equb cycle. It is exactly the same like making an ordinary 
saving because we take a return rate similar with the risk-free rate. 
 
 Assuming a 10% return from investment: In basic finance, an individual will not invest 
his money and take risk had he not been expecting a higher interest rate than the risk-
free rate (bank saving interest rate). Thus, in our case where the bank saving interest 
rate is 5%, the investor should always expect a rate of return higher than 5%.  
 
Given: 10% annual return; return paid weekly; the return from the investment will not 
be withdrawn; and the individual gets the first pot as well as invests it immediately, the 
expected income at the end of the year will be 10,706.15 ETB. The income 
systematically decreases as the period when the individual won and invest the pot 
money become far from the first period of the equb cycle. Figure 15 shows the interest 
to be gained at the end of the equb cycle if the individual gets the pot at different 
periods in the cycle assuming that the return will be paid weekly. 
 
Figure 15: Interest to be gained by investing the pot money at 10% return rate (interest to be paid weekly) 
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If the interest is going to be paid at the end of the year or at the 52nd period in our case, 
the figure will be a little bit different. For example if the individual win the pot at the 
first period as well as invests it immediately at 10% annual return paid once at the end 
of the 52nd week, the net gain will be 10,200 ETB instead of 10,706.15 ETB when the 
interest is paid every week. The following graph shows the slightly different amount of 
interest when it is paid once at the end of the year. 
 
Figure 16: Interest to be gained by investing the pot money at 10% return rate (interest to be paid once a year) 
 
Once we calculate the gain from investing the pot money at 10% rate, we can compare 
the results with the risk free gain that we calculate in scenario (i). As compared to the 
return earned at 5% return rate, the income at 10% return rate is a little more than 
double. In this case the breakeven period where the net gain from the ordinary bank 
saving scenario in (i) and the net gain from investment using the pot money in equb will 
be far to the right from the center. At 10% return, the period where the individual will 
be indifferent is period 39. Therefore, if the individual gets the pot at and before the 39th 
period he will be financially better off than making an ordinary saving in a bank. Figure 
17 shows the financial benefit from making an ordinary saving and joining equb to 
invest the pot at 10% annual return rate where the interest is paid weekly. 
 
Figure 17: Point where the income from ordinary saving and the return from investment of the pot money meets 
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As the investment return rate increases, the breakeven period will approach to the end of the 
cycle. This implies that, if an individual expects to invest the pot money at a business where 
the return rate is higher than the risk free rate, he will be better off by joining equb even if he 
wins the pot at the later stages of the equb cycle. As the interest rate increases, the equilibrium 
point will go far to the right and vice versa, citrus paribus. 
 
By looking at all the above graphs, it can be reached at the following generic formula. The 
formula is applicable for an individual who want to choose from making an ordinary annuity 
saving or joining equb to finally invest the pot money at an interest rate of i compounded n 
times (where n indicates the number of periods in a year). 
 
First, find the net financial gain (interest income) form risk free investment (making an 
ordinary annuity saving) using the ordinary annuity formula – this is used as a standard to 
compare the financial gains from equb participation. 
 
       Net financial gain (interest income) = PMT [((1 + i)n – 1) / i] – [PMT * n] ……….. (1) 
 
Second, in order to get the net financial gain from investing the pot money it is possible to use 
the future value of money formula with little modification. The future value of a fixed amount 
of money can be calculated using: 
 
               Future Value = PV [1 + i ]n ....................................................................................(2) 
Where, PV - is the present value of the fixed amount to be invested (deposited)  
 
If an individual wants to calculate the period when s/he will be indifferent from saving his/her 
money in an ordinary annuity way or joining equb to save/invest the pot money somewhere it 
can be done using the following steps: 
 
Step 1: calculate the interest to be gained by making an ordinary annuity saving in a bank 
– calculated using formula (1).   
Step 2: substitute the net gain value found in step 1 to the modified version of formula 2 
to find the value of X -1 using the formula: 
 
                     Net gain = {PV [1 + i]x-1} - PV………………...……………………………….(3) 
 
Where, x-1 - is the period where the benefit of joining equb will equal to net 
gain 
 
In order to use the above formula, one should know the financial gain from the risk free 
scenario. Once that is found, the value of x-1 can be found by substituting the values in 
formula 3. But one needs to take care while interpreting the value of x-1. The value indicates 
the remaining number of periods where the individual will be worse off if he wins the pot. For 
example, if the value of x-1 is 7, then this means the individual will be better off if and only if 
he can win the pot on and before the 7th period from the last period of the equb cycle. 
Assuming the total number of 52 participants in equb and the value of x-1 as 13, this means 
that the individual will be better off if s/he can win on or before the 39th period of the equb 
cycle. Thus for all equbs where there are N participants, the individual will be financially 
better off by joining equb if he can win before the N - (x-1) period. 
 
5.1.2 Equb as a credit mechanism 
 
In the examples above we consider a situation where the individual considers equb as a saving 
mechanism. But an individual could also use the institution as a credit mechanism. 
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 Scenario one: individuals use equb as a credit mechanism and they consider interest rate                        
as a factor to choose from equb and formal institution 
  
Let us assume that an individual applies and gets a credit facility of 312,000 ETB due in 2 
years. According to Access Capital (www, access capital, 2011), the average lending interest 
rate in Ethiopia as of April 2011 stood at 10.3%. Assuming a quarterly repayment schedule, 
the total interest can be calculated using the formula: 
         
                         Where: - C is the periodic payment amount 
                                       P0 is the principal,  
                                       r is the annual interest rate, 
                                       N is the number of payments 
 
By applying the formula, the total interest that the individual is going to pay in two years will 
be 37,224.56 ETB where he is expected to make a quarterly repayment of 43,653.08 ETB. If 
the repayment is going to be on monthly basis, the total interest to be paid will be 34,466.62 
ETB. Then, let us assume the same individual joins an equb with a weekly contribution of 
3,000 ETB where the number of participants is 104 by which he can win a same lump sum 
amount like the bank loan he request i.e. 312,000 ETB. When he won the pot money, 
obviously will avoid the interest that he had to pay had the money been a bank loan. This will 
be a pure financial benefit that the individual will earn. If the individual cannot win the pot in 
an early period of the cycle, then he will be indifferent with a bank loan if he buys the pot 
from the equb or another individual up to the cost of 37,224.56 ETB. At this point he will be 
indifferent and will start to look at other factors like the timing of the money, the processing 
cost and the like if the buying cost of the pot is going to be higher than 37,224.56.  
 
The same scenario could be taken to the medium and small size equbs. Unlike the big equbs 
where we consider bank as an option, we will consider the case of MFI for small and medium 
size equbs. This is because banks usually are not expected to offer credit of small size. The 
borrowing interest rate in MFIs is even much higher than the bank interest rate. According to 
the data found from Meket Microfinance Institution, the annual interest rate in MFIs range 
from 15% to 20% putting the average interest rate at 17.5%. In order to get a glimpse about 
the financial benefit for small and medium size equb members, we should calculate the 
interest that an individual is going to pay in the same way as we do for the big equbs. If we 
assume the individual will take a loan of 12,000 ETB from an MFI with a monthly repayment 
scheme to be paid in a year with an interest rate of 17.5%, the total interest that s/he will pay 
will be 1,167.72 ETB. If the same individual is going to join equb with 12 members where the 
contribution is on monthly basis, he can get a lump sum amount of 12,000 ETB. By doing so, 
he avoids an interest expense of 1,167 ETB. Of course this could be true if the individual is 
able to get the pot money as early as he can get the loan from the MFI. 
 
 Scenario two: individuals use equb as a credit mechanism and consider both interest rate 
and transaction cost as a factor to choose from equb and formal institution 
 
In the first scenario we consider interest rate as a critical factor for choice made by an 
individual from formal financial institution and equb. But interest rate may not be the only 
factor for some individuals. They might be much concerned about the timeliness instead. 
Thus the individual will consider the time that the finance will be ready for use, the 
processing fee, the bureaucracy to be followed to secure the finance and other variables that 
will make the transaction cost higher. The transaction cost cannot be generalized for every 
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individual. It is dependent on the situation where the individual is at including his/her income, 
the amount s/he demands, the distance to formal financial institutions, etc. The transaction 
costs will be added on the interest expense of borrowing and will give the final figure 
indicating the total cost of borrowing from bank or the total cost of getting pot money from 
equb. Thus, we can be sure that the cost of borrowing from banks will be higher than the 
interest income to the extent of the transaction cost.  
 
Concluding the financial analysis: 
 
The following concluding remarks are drawn from the points discussed above  
 
I. If the individual is going to deposit the pot money s/he win in a bank at the average 
bank saving interest rate, the breakeven point is always in the middle. Even if we 
make the interest rate 100%, it merely moves one period back! Thus if the individual 
win before half of the equb cycle, s/he will be better off than making an ordinary 
annuity saving in a bank. 
 
II. If the individual is going to invest the pot money at a higher return rate than the risk 
free rate, then the breakeven point will move to the right i.e the individual will be 
better off by joining equb instead of making an ordinary saving in a bank though he 
win pot money in late periods. 
 
Implications: 
 
 For those who join equb to be committed or for some other reason and want to take the 
last pot, the equb is costing them a value equal to the interest they could have enjoyed  
by making an ordinary saving in a bank. Net payment to the service they intended to 
get from equb, however is equal to: 
 
= (the interest they forgo + the transaction cost they incur in equb - the transaction cost 
had they use the bank) 
 
Usually the transaction cost in formal institutions is higher than the informal and 
hence the net loss after calculating transaction cost will be lower than the interest they 
forgo! 
 
 For those who use the equb as a credit mechanism and use the ordinary bank saving as 
a standard, the net gain they enjoy by joining equb will be: 
 
= the gain from the investment + the transaction cost in bank - transaction cost in equb 
 
By the same effect of the transaction cost, the net gain from joining equb will be 
higher that the gain from investment. 
 
 For those who use the equb as a credit mechanism and use bank lending rate as a 
standard, the net gain they enjoy by joining equb will be: 
 
= the interest expense they avoid + transaction cost in bank - transaction cost in equb 
 
By the same effect of the transaction cost, the net gain from joining equb will be 
higher that the interest expense avoided. 
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5.2 Analyzing the empirical findings 
 
5.2.1 Reasonable number of members 
 
The number of participants in a given cycle of an equb is decided by the members themselves 
and sometimes the equb organizers. The empirical evidence collected for this research shows 
that members in big equbs want the number of participants to be large while the medium and 
small size equb members want the number of members to be small. The reason for the big 
equb members is their need to win a large sum of money in one cycle. Large money collected 
from equb is usually used to finance working capital of an established business or to expand 
an already running business or even to establish a new business which will otherwise be 
impossible or when it is possible a bit costly. The medium and small size equb members on 
the other hand want to have small number of members in the group. This is because their need 
is only to save and commit themselves probably to purchase some durable good or spend it on 
some holiday. As the number of participants gets larger, the time that the cycle will be 
completed will get longer. Members in big equbs prefer an average cycle length between 1 
and 2 years, while the medium and small size equbs prefers the cycle to be completed in less 
than a year time. In the big equbs, a cycle can accommodate more individuals than the 
medium and small equbs since the contribution frequency is usually on weekly basis. The 
contribution frequency also matches with the income generation capacity of the members in 
the group. The medium size equbs, where members usually earn a regular monthly income, 
the contribution is on monthly basis while it is weekly for the traders. 
 
5.2.2 Time preference to take the pot, pot assignment mechanism and 
willingness to change the pot order 
 
As it was presented in the previous chapter, the empirical finding shows that most of the 
members in big equbs preferred to win the pot money at the beginning. This is because they 
are financially motivated to join equbs. They always want to work using the money. Thus, it 
is possible to view the equb as a credit mechanism for big equb members since they reflect a 
desire to take the funds as early as possible. This motive is also reflected in their choice 
regarding the pot assignment mechanism. The lottery way of pot assignment is preferred 
among big equb members. This is because most of them need the money as early as possible 
and hence the only way to fairly distributing it will be to use lottery. The bid kind of pot 
assignment is also practiced in big equbs which shows the need of members to take early even 
by paying a charge for the money. When they are asked about their willingness to change the 
pot order to another member, most of them are not willing to do so since they always need the 
money. Even those who are willing to change the order said they will not do that for free. 
They want a commission or in other words they want to sale to those who need. This is 
another indicator that members in big equbs are mostly financially motivated when they join 
equbs.  
 
The time preference trend in the medium and small size equbs is different from the big ones. 
Most of the members do not want to win the pot at the beginning. Most of the small size equb 
members instead want to take the pot money at the end which is a typical characteristic of an 
individual who wants to commit him/her self to saving. In small equbs, members want the pot 
to be assigned based on need which is an expression of solidarity in the group – members are 
willing to give the pot to a member who needs it badly. This is a perfect contrary practice to 
the big equbs. In the medium size equbs, the preference to take the pot is distributed among 
periods. Some of them want to take at the beginning, some need it in the middle and some 
other needs at the end. Based on the empirical finding, this could be because most of the 
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members in middle size equbs have a plan to purchase some durable good when they join 
equb and hence they are indifferent about the timing to win the pot. Members in small and 
medium size equbs are also willing to change the pot order for free if another member has an 
urgent need of money than the person who actually wins the pot. This shows that the middle 
and small size members’ motive to join equb is not totally financial. 
 
5.2.3 Equb structure and member selection criteria 
 
Equbs could operate with a written agreement or without. The empirical finding shows that all 
of the big equbs operates their day to day activity based on a written agreement. The small 
and medium size equbs, on the other hand, usually do not have a written agreement. In an 
equb, usually there is someone who will facilitate activities starting from its establishment to 
the end. In the big ones, the organizers will be compensated in cash from the contribution of 
the other members but not in small and medium size equbs. The organizers in small and 
medium equbs are either individuals who want to take the first pot or someone who is a 
volunteer.  
 
As far as the member selection criterion is concerned, the researcher has found that member 
selection criteria, equb size and the motive to join have a relationship. Accordingly, members 
in big equbs do not worry about the composition of members in the equb they are 
participating. Since the big equbs are more organized and every member will sign on the 
agreement (see appendix VI for sample written agreement) every member do not need to 
know each other. The equb organizers are usually responsible for a payment default by a 
member and they will actually get paid for the risk they assume and the role they play for the 
smooth functioning of the equb. Thus, the rest of the members do not really worry as long as 
the default rate is kept low and they can get their money back. Their motive is just financial! 
Transaction made in big equbs then involves some cost for the members since the organizers 
should be compensated. In most cases, every member will make one extra contribution which 
will be paid as remuneration for the organizers. The members have accepted this as normal. 
Despite the fact that organizers will get compensated for the service, most of the members do 
not want to be part of the organizers team; they just want to be ordinary members even if they 
are aware that they will pay for the service offered by the organizers. This will lead to a 
question - if being a participant in an equb costs them financially, then why do they prefer 
equb than formal institutions or individual lenders? There could only be one answer here. It is 
because the cost in equb is lower than the other alternatives of financing. 
 
When it comes to the medium size equbs, members need other members to be in the same 
working place, or residence area. This, according to them, will help to control the activities of 
other members. The group as a whole is liable for any default by a single member. Members 
do not want to have paid organizers instead they use a volunteer member to do the job. That 
volunteer individual could be someone who needs to take the first pot. This could be because 
the number of participants is manageable as compared to large size equbs and assignment of 
organizers will bring its own costs like compensating the organizer for the duty s/he performs. 
What all the members want is the commitment and they don’t want to either incur a cost by 
paying for the organizers or to get compensated by becoming an organizer. This also works 
for the small size equb participants. The only difference between the small and the medium 
size equbs is that members in small size equbs prefer other members to stand in the same 
social strata like religion. This is probably because there is a social aspect of equb 
participation in small size equbs. According to the empirical data collected small equb 
members join equb for social reasons. They perefer equb than other associations fully 
dedicated to social activities because they want to embrace individuals who want to enjoy the 
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social and financial benefits at the same time. In addition, in equb, the members will be more 
committed not only for the finance but also for the social activities too. 
 
5.2.4 Time value of money and interest calculation 
 
An individual who is financially motivated while joining RoSCA is expected to calculate the 
financial benefit that he is going to enjoy by becoming a member. As expected most of the big 
equb members think about the time value of their money in equb and that is why they always 
want to take the money early. Most of the small size equb members to the contrary do not 
think about the time value of money in equb. This is because their very motive is not to 
multiply the money or getting profit out of it. The social values and the sense of solidarity are 
high in small size equbs. More than half of the big equb members (60%) prefer the 
introduction of interest calculation into equb money. This clearly indicates their financial 
motive to join equb. Most of the medium and small size equb members do not want the 
installation of interest to equb money because they think that it will basically be against the 
concept of friendship and solidarity. In addition they stated that it would look like a loan from 
an individual (what they call “Arata” in Ethiopia). This clearly shows that the medium and 
small size equb members value friendship and other social factors beyond the financial 
motive.  
 
5.2.5 What could replace equb if it ceases to exist?  
 
The empirical findings shows that, for most of the big size equb members, banks and MFIs 
can substitute the service they are currently enjoying from equb. This shows that big equb 
members are enjoying the financial services of equbs. For most of the small equb members, to 
the contrary, nothing else can substitute the service they are enjoying from equb. The medium 
equb members are in the middle where half of them said they can substitute the service of 
equb by using formal institutions and the rest said either iddir, or mahiber or nothing else can 
do so. The perception towards a product as a substitute for another could be an indicator for 
why the individual really need the products. Accordingly, from the response of the equb 
members we can see that the financial motive outweighs the other motives for the big equbs 
while this is not true for the small and medium size equbs. 
 
5.3 Assessing earlier suggestions based on the empirical findings 
 
Suggestions developed so far in the field indicates that participants join RoSCAs to purchased 
durable goods (Dejene, 1993; Besley, et al., 1993), or to provide insurance (Söndsor, 2010), 
or to reduce social pressure from different directions (Ambech and Treich, 2003), or to 
commit himself in the presence of time inconsistent preferences (Gugerty, 2007). Those 
suggestions will be tested using the empirical data collected from equbs in Ethiopia in the 
following sections. Based on the empirics and the critics of those suggestions, the researcher 
will come up with his own findings. 
 
5.3.1 Equb as a means to purchase of durable good 
 
In an early attempt to answer the economic rationale for the establishment of RoSCAs, 
economists like Besley et al., (1993) and Dejene (1993) proposed a theory arguing that 
individuals join RoSCAs when they want to purchase durable good. The finding of this 
research also supports the theory but only for the medium size equbs. Individuals in middle 
size equbs agreed that one of the reasons behind their participation in equb is the need to 
purchase durable good. This theory may also work to some extent for individuals rural-small 
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equbs. Yet, individuals in big and urban-small equbs did not agree that the need to purchase 
durable good was their reason to join equb. Thus, based on the results of this study, it is not 
possible to generalize the applicability of the suggestion for all sizes of equbs instead we can 
say it fits for individuals in medium size equbs.  
 
A question can be raised here to challenge the suggestion developed by those scholars who 
advocate the “durable good” motive. Individuals can use the money they get from RoSCAs 
for too many reasons including purchasing consumer goods like food or cloth, spending on 
special ceremonies like weeding or graduation party or even in constructing house. Using the 
pot money to purchase durable good/s is among the many possible spending options that an 
individual has. Even if we assume that individuals join RoSCAs to purchase durable goods, is 
joining RoSCA the only mechanism to get the money should an individual purchase a durable 
good? Why don’t RoSCA participants use other available options to buy a durable good like 
saving at home and/or borrowing from banks or MFIs? Can we say it (RoSCA) is the best 
option? If we say yes, why it is? The question regarding why individuals join RoSCAs should 
answer why they don’t use other alternatives that will enable them to do the same as they are 
doing with the pot money. The “durable good” theory, however, failed to answer this 
question. 
 
5.3.2 Equb as insurance 
 
The other contending hypothesis is the insurance motive to join RoSCAs. Based on the 
empirical data collected for this research, individuals who are from rural equbs agreed that 
they consider equb as an insurance. Individuals in the urban equbs, however, do not agree 
with their rural counterparts. Thus, the insurance motive suggestion works for individuals 
participating in equb but with discretion based on where the equb is actually located since it is 
not true for the urban equbs.  
 
Insurance is when an individual is aware of risks in relation to something anticipated. Despite 
the fact that members of big equbs perceive it as insurance it is contradictory with their 
motive of taking the money early. Because once an individual takes the pot money there is no 
way that he can consider the pot as insurance money anymore! S/He should keep on returning 
in spite of any trouble s/he faces after taking the pot. Of course the other members can cancel 
the debt s/he owes to them but this is not the reality in big equbs where everyone is financially 
motivated and in need of money at early stage. 
 
Scholars subscribe for the “insurance motive” suggestion argue that exchanging order of the 
pot could be considered as insurance. However, based on the empirical findings, the 
researcher notes that this justification has its own drawbacks. First, in order to say that equb is 
insurance for members, members should be explicitly motivated to cover themselve against 
somekind of risk when they join equb. Second, the exchange of pot is totally dependent on the 
will of other members and hence it is better if this case is considered as an indication of 
solidarity and cooperation in equb.  
 
In addition, the insurance motive does not describe why RoSCA members do not actually use 
formal insurance institutions instead. Probably, formal insurance institutions cannot provide 
an insurance coverage for any loss going to happen in a household. Instead, a person should 
buy a specific insurance coverage for his car, house, health, life or some other specific risk. In 
RoSCAs, however, the pot can be taken (if not taken earlier) when something unforeseen 
occurred on an individual no matter what it is. But, above all, the transaction concept of 
transaction cost is missed in the “insurance motive” suggestion.   
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5.3.3 Equb as a mechanism to cope up social pressure and intra-household 
conflict 
 
In their model, Ambech and Treich (2003) argued that individuals join RoSCAs to escape 
from social pressure. For the equb in Ethiopia, nevertheless, this does not look like working. 
Almost all respondents, irrespective of the equb size, stated that they don’t actually use equb 
for the purpose of escaping from social pressure.  
 
The findings lead the researcher to propose a counter argument for this theory. An individual 
might for the time being say that s/he is contributing an equb and escape from relatives who 
request money. But those relatives may know when the individual is going to win the pot and 
hence they will come back with the same request but with probably a higher amount of 
money. This will happen because those relatives will assume that the individual gets a good 
sum of money and will then request for a higher amount than their previous request. It is even 
possible to argue that participating in equb may bring additional pressure from relatives 
during the time that the individual won the pot. As the participants in equb said, an individual 
cannot escape from the pressure of relatives by participating equb since the money 
contributed to equb will be back sooner or later. One could say that access to information 
might hamper relatives from asking money at the right time from an individual who won equb 
money. However, as the researcher understood from respondents for this research, it is 
possible to get information about who win when in equb after they actually receive the pot.  
 
In rural areas, the information regarding big equbs could be accessed easily given the social 
cohesion available in the community as well as recognition that participants in the big equbs 
have in the community. Members in big equbs are usually traders and when they are not 
traders the individuals have the capacity to contribute as much as those traders are 
contributing, hence have recognition and status in the community. This facilitates the smooth 
flow of information about the equb of those individuals. When it comes to the small equbs, 
members are not going to be under the same pressure like those who are in the big ones given 
their small income and equb contribution. But if someone is interested to get information, it is 
easy to access since equb meeting is usually held in public places like local beer sales houses. 
To conclude, the suggestion given by Ambech and Treich does not actually work for equbs in 
Ethiopia.  
 
The other suggestion, RoSCA as a mechanism to solve intra-household conflict, is also 
disproved in this research. All married respondents except 4 stated that they always discussed 
with their spouse about their participation in equb. They also stated that the probability that 
their spouse will hear about their participation in equb is high, even if they tried to hide. 
Hence, it they prefer to discuss with spouses. Women participants are usually believed to be 
the major group of people who use RoSCA as an intra-household conflict solving mechanism, 
according to the model. However, 93% of the female respondents who are married said that 
they discuss with their spouse before they join equb. If they discuss with their spouse, there is 
no way that they can use it as a mechanism to hide money from their spouse or solve intra-
household conflict. There is even a case where women participants receive money from their 
spouse to contribute to equb when they run out of cash let alone they hide from their spouse. 
Thus, this model failed to explain the motive of members to join Ethiopian RoSCAs (equbs). 
 
5.3.4 Equb as a commitment device 
 
After looking at the above suggestions on the rationale for the existence of RoSCAs, Gugerty 
(2007) come up with another suggestion arguing RoSCAs are used as a commitment device 
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for participants. According to the suggestion, there are people who do have a time 
inconsistent preference and lacks alternative commitment technologies. Those individuals will 
commit themselves by joining RoSCAs.  
 
The “commitment device” argument is proved using the empirical data collected for this 
research for two sizes of equbs: the middle and the urban-small equbs. It, however, does not 
work for big equbs and rural-small equbs. This is confirmed using the responses of equb 
members for three questions. One of the questions is regarding individual’s time preference to 
win the pot. Most of the respondents from medium and small size equbs do not want to take 
the pot at the beginning of the cycle. More than 72% of the members in big equbs on the other 
hand need to win the pot at the beginning. Theoretically, those individuals who want to 
commit themselves with saving do not want to win the pot at the beginning. Hence, we can 
say medium and small size equbs join equbs for the sake of commitment while members in 
big equbs are using equb as a credit mechanism. 
 
To further taste members’ perception of equb as a means of committing oneself, another 
question has been asked to respondents. When they asked about why they prefer to join or 
keep participating in equb than using formal financial institutions, most of the medium size 
equb participants stated that they either cannot be committed to save money alone or they 
don’t like the procedure and process in the formal institutions (which will be discussed later 
in detail). In the section where respondents have been asked to choose whether they agree or 
not, the medium and small size equbs has stated their agreement on equbs role as a 
commitment device.  
 
The committing feature of equb could be seen from both the saving and withdrawal side. 
From the saving side, every member is expected to contribute every period until the end of the 
cycle once they joined the group. From the withdrawal side, no member can withdraw the 
money whenever they want unless it is their turn to take the pot. The formal financial 
institutions in Ethiopia do not have yet started to provide services with special commitment 
mechanism practiced in the developed banking services like those who discussed by Ashraf et 
al., (2003). Hence, based on the empirical finding we can say that middle and small size equb 
participants join equb because they want to enjoy those “saving side” and “withdrawal side” 
commitment features of equb which they couldnot otherwise find in formal institutions. The 
“commitment device” logic, therefore, works for the small size and medium size equb 
participants but not to big equb members. 
 
In spite of all the above facts, the researcher argued that there is still a gap that the 
“commitment device” suggestion does not actually fill in understanding the discipline fully. 
The “commitment device” suggestion has covered only one side of the story. As explained by 
Rutherford (n.d), saving can be transformed into large and useful sum of money in three 
patterns: “saving up”, “saving down” and “saving through”. The issue of commitment will 
take the stage when we discuss about a saving up strategy. If an individual wants to save fixed 
regular money at home or in a bank, he may suffer from time inconsistent preferences and 
may not be able to achieve his saving goals easily. But what will happen for an individual 
who want to use the saving down strategy?  
 
The findings of this research revealed that individuals in big equbs want to take the pot at the 
beginning and hence are not interested in saving and committing themselves. They instead 
want to work using the money. If an individual takes the pot at the beginning and pays it back 
for the rest of the cycle, then it can be considered as a saving down pattern. Of course the 
committing feature of RoSCAs could be enjoyed when an individual uses the saving down 
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strategy and when s/he takes the money at early periods. But formal institutions can also do 
the same. If a person takes a loan from a formal institution and repays it in some time, s/he 
will be bounded by a contract and will be committed to repay on time. Then, this will bring 
forward the same question raised earlier - why do individuals who follow saving down 
strategy actually choose RoSCAs while they have other options? Unavailability of formal 
institutions cannot work since the big equbs considered in this study use the bank as a 
medium to deposit and withdraw money collected via the equb.  
 
Gugerty (2007) has also said that “participation in these RoSCAs is costly - in terms of both 
time and inflexibility” - and argued that the benefits of commitment make these costs 
worthwhile to participants. But the researcher of this study has found that flexibility and 
timeliness are among the most important features of RoSCAs not features that members 
sacrificed to enjoy the committing feature. Members have many possibilities of getting the pot 
money during the time they really need. This can be seen from members’ willingness to 
change a pot order. Except those who are in big equbs, members are willing to change the pot 
order if one member faces an urgent problem than the one who actually won the pot at a given 
time. Even in the big equbs, a member can either buy a pot from the equb during the period 
where the pot is assigned based on auction. To the worst scenario, an individual who really 
needs the money can buy the pot from the person who won the pot since most of the members 
are willing to change with a commission or in other words are willing to sale the pot. This 
shows how equbs can be used at a time of real need and a participant have many options to 
get the money even if it is not their turn to take the pot.  
 
In the big ones, members devise a means to cope up the inflexibility that Gugerty (2007) 
argues for. The pot is assigned in a mixed way where a pot will be assigned based on auction 
every other week which will give those who need the money urgently the chance to get it on 
time. But the issue of risk could be the major concern instead. Based on their size, equbs 
deploy their own mechanism to cope up the risk. In the big ones, it is the organizers who are 
responsible for the selection and screening of members. In addition, members have to have 
someone in the equb who can sign as a guarantor, or they should provide a signed cheque 
with no date written on it or if they cannot do both they will provide a physical collateral 
immediately before they take the pot money. In the medium and small size equbs, however, 
the social collateral is the dominant way of reducing potential risk against those members who 
will stop to contribute once they take the pot. This is also additional evidence showing the 
flexibility of the service offered by RoSCAs for its members.  
 
Participation in equb for the sake of commitment is costly in terms of the opportunity cost that 
the individual forgo while joining equb. This is clearly shown in the section 5.1. If the 
individual was using the bank to save his money, he would enjoy the interest income. This is 
the cost of getting the commitment service from equb. The figure is not the same as the 
interest income, however. The net transaction cost reduced by using equb will be deducted 
from the interest income forgo if it is positive and will be added if it is negative.  
 
5.4 An alternative suggestion and justification 
 
RoSCA as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs and to enjoy financial service without 
or at least with very small cost  
 
Unlike the other questions where the answers of respondents differ based on the size of the 
equb that they belongs to, members’ response regarding why they prefer to use equb instead 
of other financial service providers like formal institutions can be generalized regardless of 
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size. Most of the respondents have stated that it is expensive to use formal institutions. Based 
on the response, the first reason for the big equbs is high interest rate in formal financial 
institutions while they can enjoy credit at lower cost, if any, from the equb. Secondly, the cost 
of making transaction with formal institutions is very high according to respondents. The third 
reason, which is somehow related to the low transaction cost, is the flexible nature of equb as 
institution.  
 
According to the respondents, the procedure and the processing time to get a loan from a 
formal institution is very long, the procedure followed is tedious, and the financing cost is 
high. Those respondents who are already using both formal institutions and equb are even 
sensitive about the processing time and the length of the procedure while choosing among 
formal institutions. Since most of the big equb members are traders, they need the money as 
soon as possible so that they can use it immediately and hence are sensitive about the 
disbursement time. The medium and small size equb members are also sensitive to the 
processing time and the procedure while using the saving up strategy in formal institutions. 
They should visit the offices of the institutions everytime they want to make a transaction. 
The cost is even much higher if they choose a saving down strategy with formal institutions.  
 
The first and the most important one in determining cost of a transaction is access to 
information about background and status of parties involved in the transaction. Information is, 
however, costly and distributed asymmetrically (North, 1995). In order to let one party 
develop a trust on the other, it should have enough information about the involving party. 
This works for formal financial institutions. Formal institutions are more likely to offer a loan 
to a customer who they know previously than offering to a new customer. This is because the 
banks have better information about the already customers than the new ones. As it is clearly 
explained in game theory, the probability of getting a cooperative solution is high when the 
players repeat the game many times. This makes the transaction cost higher for individuals 
who want to join formal institutions as a new customer since they do not have transaction 
history. This will hence encourage individuals to establish their own way of handling and 
reducing the cost of transaction which give birth to RoSCAs. As evidenced in the data 
collected for this research, many of the equbs exist for over a single life cycle though some 
members could leave or additional members could join. This helps members to have enough 
information about other members which leads to low probability of default. The main job of 
banks is managing portfolio and risks. The level of risk is dependent on the level of 
information the bearer have regarding the risk. Formal institutions can hardly get as much 
information about their customers as equbs have about their members. This risk level 
determines the cost of transaction made with the other parties. This is where equbs took 
advantage over formal institutions. 
 
The second variable affecting the transaction cost is the cost of enforcing an agreement and 
cost of measuring agents’ performance (North, 1995). In formal institutions a customer will 
sign a contract and if failed to stick with it the enforcing mechanism is taking the customer to 
a legal body. This will create additional cost for the institution and hence by calculating the 
risk as well as cost of enforcing will set a higher financing cost on their customers. Formal 
institutions also need to measure the performance of their customers once they extend their 
service which will cost them and make the interest rate higher. In RoSCAs, however, the 
enforcing and measuring cost is low which will keep the transaction cost very low since most 
of the equbs use a social enforcing mechanism. In big equbs, the organizers are responsible 
for controlling the performance of members while in small and medium equbs the whole 
group will look at each other’s performance since most of them either reside or work in 
similar places. 
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The third component of a transaction cost is travelling cost and distance (Sandsör, 2010). In 
order to perform a transaction with formal institutions an individual needs to visit the office of 
the institutions physically. This is especially true when the institutions are located in a country 
or environment where the industry is not yet able to use modern technology. In Ethiopia, a 
bank customer cannot perform banking transactions using an internet or mail. Thus, the 
customer needs to visit the office which brings its own transaction cost. This includes not only 
the travelling cost but also the opportunity cost that the individual forgoes to appear 
physically at the office. But in equbs such kind of travelling cost is minimal. First, members 
hold their periodic meetings at the place where it is not far either from their office or 
residence. Second, mostly equb meetings are held in the weekend. Therefore, members are 
not expected to sacrifice their working time to attend equb meetings, they only use their 
leisure time where meeting friends is one way of spending it. As the medium size equb 
members explicitly stated they cannot manage their account in formal institutions since they 
will quarrel with their bosses if they leave their office during a working hour. However they 
can manage the equb since the transaction will be made immediately after they receive their 
salaries in their office. While discussing with the CEO of an MFI operating in the area where 
the rural samples were taken, he said that his company do have a plan to send cashiers to the 
government offices to enable the employees to use the services without affecting their 
working time. The significance of this strategy on the equb participation of those individuals 
should be studied in the future after the implementation of the strategy by the MFI.  
 
The level of bureaucracy could be the fourth variable in calculating transaction costs 
(Sandsör, 2010). The number of steps and offices that an individual should pass through to get 
a given service determines the service speed – the longer the steps, the longer the service 
delivery time. In equb, the bureaucratic step is very small, if there is any, and will help a fast 
service delivery. As the respondents of this research stated getting a loan from a bank is not 
an easy task. According to them, the waiting time is very long which will hinder them from 
implementing what they propose. In addition, equbs enjoy very low operating and 
administrative costs, when there is any. As Bouman suggests the operating cost and the 
bureaucracy is minimum because the institutions are informal.   
 
Finally, in simple market contracting costs will be incurred in the transaction process because 
of the existence of owners on the one hand and other parties on the other. Ownership is then 
one of the mechanisms to mitigate some of the costs of transacting (Coase, 1937 cited on 
Österloh, et al., 2002) since it will at least reduce conflict of interest between contracting 
parties. Equbs are owned by the members (the customers themselves) and obviously there will 
not be an interest conflict among parties. This helps them keep the transaction cost very low.   
 
Based on the above mentioned discussion constructed using empirical findings and the 
suggestions given so far by scholars, the researcher of this study suggests that the reason why 
members of big and medium size equbs join or establish equb is to escape from high cost of 
financing in formal institutions in general and high transaction costs in particular.  
 
An individual who want to get a credit service from formal institutions should wait until the 
application is processed where the process bear its own cost. The individual, therefore, want 
to avoid those costs by joining equb. The timeliness and flexibility features discussed above 
reduce the cost of transaction. But this does not mean that there is no transaction cost at all in 
equbs but it is small as compared to the cost in formal financial institutions.     
 
As it can be learnt from the empirical finding and the analysis made above, the study revealed 
that big equb members are considering the institution as a credit mechanism and the reason 
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for not using other credit mechanisms is high interest rate and transaction cost. The study 
result has also suggested that the low transaction cost in equbs is what attracts those members 
who want to use equbs as a saving mechanism (those who want to purchase durable good and 
want to commit themselves for saving).  
 
5.5 Discussion of results with other similar studies 
 
This study confirms some of the findings of similar studies conducted previously in Ethiopia. 
Mauri (1987) for example, lists some of the reasons why members join equb. His list 
includes: members like the contractual and forced saving nature of equb; flexible and 
adaptable nature of equb to various needs and situations; “low or practically non-existent cost 
of administration and transaction”, absence of threshold minimum investment; and the 
probable tendency of gambling in equb which the lottery holds. The finding of this study 
resembles with some of the suggestions given by Mauri (1987). Accordingly, the medium and 
small size equb members join the institutions because of their need to enjoy the committing 
nature of equbs. Members in all size equbs are also motivated to enjoy a very reduced, if 
available, transaction cost while getting the financial services from equbs. One of the 
suggestions of Mauri is not confirmed in this study. Members did not show any tendency to 
the feeling of gambling by participating in equbs. The flexible and adaptable nature of equbs 
has played a very important role for the existence of the institutions in all sizes of equbs. The 
study conducted by Dejene (1993) has also stressed the importance of self-discipline, 
flexibility, timeliness and collective action from participation as important reasons for 
members to join equbs. In his recent study, Temesgen (2008) found that the most important 
reason for members for joining equbs is their need to secure finance for less cost as compared 
to the formal financial institutions.   
 
In an empirical study conducted in Benin by Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher (2008) it is found 
that the major motive for RoSCA participation is the need for a commitment to save. In a 
study carried out in Kenya, Gugerty (2007) has also found the major reason for members to 
join RoSCAs is the demand for a committing device for saving. One of the findings of this 
study resembles with the findings in Benin and Kenya. However, the results of this study 
shows the need for commitment device is a motive for only participants in medium and small 
size equbs. In addition, the results of this study revealed that the committing feature of equbs 
could be used beyond financial needs. It serves as a commitment device for social activities 
too for small size equbs.  
 
Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher (2008) has also found that Beninese RoSCA participants do not 
use RoSCAs as a mechanism to solve intra-household conflicts. This is evidenced by the 
requirement set by Beninese RoSCAs. Many of them request an approval from spouses of 
each member before they join. In addition most of the RoSCAs organize a party at the end of 
every cycle where non-member friends and neighbors will be invited and participate. This 
will give participants no chance to use it as an intra-household mechanism since information 
will sure be leak out of the members. In the empirical study conducted in Kenya, Gugerty 
(2007) has also found that RoSCA participation is not a mechanism to keep money away from 
husbands rather it is a household strategy. The results found from this research resemble with 
the study in both Benin and Kenya in this regard. The requirements set by some equbs as well 
as the information flow in the community are reasons that hinder members from using equbs 
as a mechanism to solve intra-household mechanism.  
 
Like the findings in Kenya by Gugerty (2007) members in Ethiopian RoSCAs do not use 
equbs for explicit insurance coverage although members in rural equbs said that they 
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sometimes perceived it as insurance. However, the equbs can be used to deliver limited 
implicit insurance when members suffer from a negative shock.  
 
Most of the studies previously carried out on the field, except the one by Mauri (1987) 
overlook the motive of RoSCA participants to reduce transaction costs and total costs 
incurred because of other source of financing including formal financial institutions. The 
results of this study, however, suggest that one of the reasons why members participate in 
RoSCAs is to reduce cost of using financial services in general and transaction cost in 
particular.  
 
When we consider studies conducted on RoSCAs in general, most of them stated that 
RoSCAs are usually established and used by women. It is this belief that push researches on 
the field to concentrate on the small size RoSCAs, even if the researchers do not explicitly 
mention that they focus on small RoSCAs. This can be inferred from the results they come up 
with. The conclusions they made are also biased towards small RoSCAs since the belief that 
the institutions are established to serve the need of poor women in developing countries. The 
result of this study however shows that RoSCAs could be established by let alone men but 
also businessmen who are running big businesses. The new suggestion derived from the 
empirical finding of the study will hopefully bring a shift on the way RoSCAs are understood 
in this regard. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
Based on the empirical findings, different trends have been identified regarding members 
motive to join as well as other variables of RoSCAs. First of all, it is found that the equb size 
and the level of formality in equb are directly related, i.e. as the equb size gets larger, the equb 
became more formalized. This has been shown in the form of agreement prepared for 
membership and establishment as well as the way the day to day operation is managed. It is 
also expressed in terms of the charge paid by members to the equb, and the time they should 
wait to get the pot if they cannot either buy it or win the lottery.  This affects the costs and 
benefits of joining equb, at least the financial benefit. The formality and equb size relationship 
is also an indicator for the wider usage as well as flexibility nature of equbs which in turn 
paves the way for members to join the perfect fit size of equb to satisfy their motive.  
 
The formalization in big equbs is high because the involved money is relatively huge as 
compared to middle and small size equbs. In addition, as the number of participants gets 
larger, the possibility that every member will know each other will reduce. These two factors 
bring their own risk for members. In order to reduce the risk and develop the trust among each 
other, the institutions prefer to make themselves a bit formal. The formality level, however, 
does not affect the flexibility nature of the institution that much and it is not comparable with 
the levl of the formal institutions.  
 
Secondly, based on the findings, it is possible to say that most of middle size equb members 
are indeed motivated to join because they want to purchase durable good. However, this does 
not give an explicit answer why do they choose equb instead of using other alterbatives to 
purchase durable goods. Those individuals who are motivated to purchase durable goods 
could use any of the three strategies to save money for the purchase - to save up, save down or 
save through. The finding of this study suggests that, individuals cannot implement the saving 
up strategy in bank or at home since those options lack the committing feature. The higher 
transaction cost on the other hand hinder individuals from implementing saving down strategy 
using formal institutions. Equb, however, can serve as a means to implement the saving up 
strategy by overcoming the shortcoming of the saving alone at home or bank option which is 
lack of commitment, or the saving down strategy by offering the service with little transaction 
cost, if there is any.  
 
Thirdly, although RoSCA can be used as a commitment device for medium and small size 
equbs, the results of this study does not suggest that it is a common motive among big size 
equb members. The big equb members are instead interested to avoid higher costs caused by 
higher transaction costs in formal institutions. Thus, they prefer to use equb as a mechanism 
to reduce the cost of financing. As compared to formal institutions, the average waiting 
period, the transaction cost as well as the interest expense is very low in equbs. This attracts 
members in big equbs to join.  
 
The commitment motive could also apply for small size equb members, however, with a little 
modification. The members in small size equbs do not want to commit themselves with the 
saving of the money. They are instead interested on other social commitments. They think 
that they will not be as committed as they should be if they use other associations that cover 
merely the social aspect. The results of this study reveal that members in small size equbs are 
more interested in the social life they enjoy by joining equb. Equb is an institution where they 
can show their cooperation and solidarity with others who they think are their friends found in 
same social strata.   
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The informal financial institutions are different in the way they treat risk and manage 
portfolio. The information that members have about each other’s background helps everyone 
establish an organization where every member can achieve his/her own goal. The availability 
of information will also allow the making of transactions easily and less costly, when there is 
any. This makes every member to keep on participating instead of using some other means. 
Equbs are all in one institutions where one can enjoy credit service for less cost (as demanded 
in big and middle size equbs), saving committing feature of both from deposit and withdrawal 
side (as demanded by medium and small size equbs), and friendship or social cohesion (as 
demanded by small size equbs. 
 
To conclude the researcher has found that 3 of the four hypotheses made at the beginning are 
true. Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4 are confirmed using the empirical data, while hypothesis 2 found 
false. The study result suggests that the motive to join equb differs based on size. Members in 
small, medium and big size equbs expressed that their reason for joining equb is different. The 
big equb members are influenced by financial motives, the medium size members need the 
commitment feature, and the small size equb members enjoy the socialization feature of 
equbs. Previous studies made in the field have attempted to give a single answer irrespective 
of the size of equbs where members are part of. The results of this research, hence, mark a 
point of departure for future investigations in the field. 
 
When we say big equb members are financially motivated and the institution basically serves 
the financial need of participants does not mean that big equbs do not have the features that 
we can find in middle and small size equbs. Of course there is socialization and commitment 
in big equbs. Members in medium size equbs also enjoy the credit service from one another 
so do members in small size equbs. The point is, nevertheless, the financial motive dominates 
other motives in big size equbs, the social motive dominates other motives in small size 
equbs, and the commitment motive outweighs other motives in medium size equbs. The 
flexible nature of equbs contributes much for all those features that the institution holds. The 
institutions are informal and enjoy flexibility feature which otherwise is limited in formal 
institutions. The results of this study are in line with Bouman’s explanation regarding benefits 
of becoming informal. In deed it is the informal features of equb that attracts and keep 
individuals to participate in equb. 
 
Formal financial institutions in Ethiopia can attract customers from equbs in two ways. The 
first way is to reduce transaction cost in particular and the total fee they charge to offer a 
financial service. Secondly, they should develop modern services that will help their 
customers to be committed towards their savings (like services explained by Ashraf et al., 
2003). By doing so, formal institutions can attract those individuals who are “financially 
motivated” and in need of commitment. It is, however, very hard – if possible – to bring those 
individuals who are socially motivated while joining equbs. 
 
Based on the results of this study, future research areas in the field could be: 
 Is there a change on the equb structure and operation? If yes what are the trends and 
why? 
 How much reduction in cost of using informal institutions could attract the attention of 
equb members who are financially motivated when joining equb? 
 May the introduction of developed “saving side” and “withdrawal side” commitment 
mechanisms in formal banking system attract individuals who join equb for the sake 
of getting committed? 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix I. Meeting of equb members  
 
 
Photo 1: meeting in one of the sample big equb (photograph: by own) 
 
 
Photo 2: meeting in one of the sample small equb (photograph: by own) 
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Appendix II. Questionnaire distributed to respondents – English version 
 
                                      Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
                              Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
                                                  Department of Economics 
 
Questionnaire to be filled by equb members 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
My name is Bisrat Agegnehu. I am a 2nd year MSc student in Business and Economics at the 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. Currently, I am writing my thesis on equbs, with 
a title “what motivates members to join equbs?”  
 
The objective of this study cannot be realized without your cooperation to fill this 
questionnaire. I therefore kindly request you to answer these questions based on your 
experience. There is no need of writing your name and I guarantee that your answers will only 
be used for the research purpose.  
 
Thank you very much in advance for your time! 
Bisrat Agegnehu 
 
Note: Mark “X” in the box in front of your choice. 
Choose only one answer except for the questions where it is stated as allowed to choose 
more than one 
 
I. Background information 
1. Sex 
A.  Male                                B. Female  
 
2. Age 
A. Below 20           B. 20 – 29                               C. 30 - 39       
D.     40 - 49                 E. 50 and above  
 
3. Marital status 
A. Single                B. Married             C. Divorced             D. Widow   
 
4. Academic status 
A. Basic writing and reading         B. Elementary school         C.   High school                       
D.   Diploma                  E.  First degree                 F. Master’s degree and above  
 
5. Occupation (possible to choose more than one) 
A. Government employee        B. NGO employee       C. Private Sector employee   
D.  Trader                                   E. Farmer         F. Other, please specify ________ 
 
6. If your answer for no.5 is trader, in what sector are you working? ____________________ 
 
7. How much is your average monthly income in Birr?_______________________ 
8. How much do you contribute to equb monthly? __________________________ 
9. Which equb do you want to join based on the frequency of the pot assignment?                  
A. Daily       B. Weekly        C. Biweekly        D. Monthly        E. other ______ 
 
10. For how many years have you been participating in equb? 
                                                       period 
Below 1 yr 1 – 3 yr 3 – 5 yr 5 – 10 yr Above 10 yr 
Equb in general      
In the particular equb 
you are active now 
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11. In which of the following institutions were you active and for how long? 
 
Institution name  Were you 
a member 
                         If yes, for how long? Remark 
(Mark X if 
you are still 
active) 
Yes No below 1yr 1 – 3 yr 3 – 5 yr 5 – 10 yr Above 10 yr 
Bank  As depositor         
As borrower         
Micro -
finance 
institution 
As depositor         
As borrower         
Insurance company         
Mahiber         
Edir         
Debo         
Other_______________         
 
II. About equb choice and structure 
 
1. What is equb for you? (possible to choose more than one) 
A. A financial institution like bank, micro finance institution, or insurance  
B. An association that I strengthen my friendship with others  
C. An association where I show up my solidarity with others  
D. Other, please specify_________________________________________________ 
 
2. Why did you join your first equb? (possible to choose more than one) 
A. Because there was no bank or micro finance branch near my residence  
B. To buy a durable good  
C. To help my friend who was organizing equb to take the first pot  
D. Because I can’t save alone at home  
E. Everyone in the community was participating, so I joined not to be different   
F. Because of the pressure from my friends  
G. Other, please specify_________________________________________________ 
 
3. When is the best period or time in the equb cycle for you to take the pot? 
A. At the beginning                                          B. In the middle  
C.   At the end                                              D. I don’t care about the order  
E.     Other, please specify_________________________________________________ 
 
4. Why do you choose that period in question no. 3? ________________________________ 
 
5. Which one do you prefer?  
A. To join an already established equb with written agreement   
B. To join an already established equb without a written agreement  
C. To organize a new one as per my need with a written agreement  
D. To organize a new one as per my need without a written agreement   
E. To join already established equb, I don’t care about the agreement   
F. To organize a new one, I don’t care about agreement  
G. Other, please specify__________________________________________________ 
 
6. Which kind of equb do you prefer to join if you have to choose based on the pot 
assignment criteria? 
A. The equb where the pot is assigned on a lottery basis  
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B. The equb where the pot is assigned based on need      
C. The equb where the pot is assigned based on bid  
D. I don’t mind  
E. Other, please specify_________________________________________________           
7. When do you want the order to be assigned? 
A. It must be assigned at the beginning of the cycle for the whole period  
B. It must be assigned at the beginning of each period  
C. I don’t mind  
D. Other, please specify__________________________________________________  
8. Do you usually made a cost benefit analysis before joining a given equb? 
A. Yes                                                             B. No  
9. If yes, what variables do you consider in evaluating your membership? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
10. Have you ever thought about time value of money in equb?  A. Yes                  B. No  
 
11. Do you think that it will be better for the equb as institution and its members if calculation 
of interest is going to be started?     A. Yes                                 B. No   
12. Do you always discuss with your spouse whenever you join equb? 
A. Yes                       
B. No    Why? ______________________________________________________ 
13. Have you ever been in more than one equb at a time? Why?_________________________ 
14. How many participants do you want to have, on average, in one equb cycle that you are 
part of? 
A. Less than 10            B. 10 – 20         C.    21 – 30          D. More than 30  
E.    I don’t mind            F.  Other, please specify_____________________________ 
15. How long do u think is the best due date length in a given equb cycle? 
A. Less than half a year            B. 6 months – 1 year                 C.   1 – 2 year                             
D.   More than 2 year                     E. I don’t care  
16. Why do you choose that period? _____________________________________________ 
17. What criteria of membership do you look when you join equb? (possible to choose more than one) 
A. Members should be related by blood  
B. Other members should be from the same professional status  
C. Other members should be from the same village  
D. Other members should be from the same ethnic group  
E. Other members should be from the same religious group  
F. I don’t really care  
G. Other, please specify__________________________________________________ 
18. Why do you consider that criteria in no. 17? _____________________________________ 
19. Have you ever perceived participation in equb as a social obligation? A. Yes    B. No  
20. Are you always willing to change pot position in a case where one of the members wants 
the pot at your turn for emergency case? Why? ___________________________________ 
21. Have you ever asked the same favour too?        A. Yes                               B. No  
22. Is this feature an important component in equb for you?   A. Yes               B. No  
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23. Assume that you reach at a point where you are not able to pay the periodic contribution 
for your equb. Will you be worried that much about it?           A. Yes              B. No  
24. If your answer for 23 is yes, which one of the following reasons will make you more 
worried? 
A. The legal consequence, since it will be taken to court  
B. My participation in future equb will be limited  
C. The social pressure and discrimination by members from other social activities  
D. The social pressure from the community outside the equb members group  
E. Other, please specify ________________________________________________ 
25. If your answer for no. 23 is no, why don’t you get worried that much? 
A. Other members will understand the situation and give me additional time for 
payment  
B. Other members will understand the situation and allow me to forgo the monthly 
payments  
C. Because I can join other equb easily  
D. Because it will not have any implication in my future relation with the members  
E. Other, please specify__________________________________________________ 
 
III. Equb, motivation and formal financial sector 
 
26. Have you ever participate in equb where you need to show collateral to be a member? 
A. Yes                                                                 B. No  
27. Does the equb that you are a member now put collateral as a requirement for membership? 
A. Yes                                                                 B. No  
28. Why do you keep on participating in equb while you have a chance to work with banks or 
micro finance institutions? (possible to choose more than one) 
A. Because bank branches are too far from my residence  
B. Because the deposit interest rate is low, I will not be benefited by depositing there 
C. Because the loan interest rate is high in banks and microfinance institutions, it is 
expensive to borrow  
D. Because of the long service delivery time in banks and microfinance institutions  
E. Because I don’t have full trust on banks and micro finance institutions  
F. I don’t want to bother myself with questions and procedures about the money I am 
going to deposit  
G. If I borrowed money from banks or microfinance institutions I will not enjoy full 
right on where to spend the money  
H. If I go to banks or MFIs, other parties including the government will have full 
information about my transactions   
I. Because I already have a very good experience with equbs  
J. Other please specify__________________________________________________ 
29. Which institution or association could you use as a substitute for equb? 
A. Bank              B. Microfinance institution                           C.   Edir                                           
D.   Mahiber          E. Nothing can substitute it                           F. Other, ___________ 
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30. As you know, many share companies are being established in the country and are 
providing an investment choice for the public. Does this have an impact on your future 
decisions to join equbs?           A. Yes                                                            B. No  
31. Have you ever had a discussion with other members in equbs that you were part of about 
transforming your equbs into formal institution like saving and credit association? 
A. Yes                                                            B. No  
32. If your answer for 31 is yes, do you think that it is possible to keep the values of equb in 
the newly transformed institution?_____________________________________________ 
33. If your answer for 31 is no, why?______________________________________________ 
34. What do you think about organizers of equbs?____________________________________ 
 
IV. General remarks about equb 
 
35. Are you satisfied with the institutional structure and performance of equbs that you have 
been part of so far? If no, what do you think should be improved in the operation of equbs? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
36. Do you perceive any change in the structure and operation of equbs during the time that 
you are active in equb membership?                    A. Yes                              B.  No  
37. What do you think is the major problem in equbs? ________________________________ 
38. What reason do you think will force you to cease participating in equb once and forever?   
39. Please indicate which of the following reasons has ever motivated you to join equb 
                                              Reason to join                        Scale 
Agree neutral disagree
I don’t have access to formal financial institutions    
It is expensive to use formal institutions    
I feel ashamed to go to formal institutions to save small amount of money    
To purchase durable goods    
Equb is an insurance for me in case of cash need in the future    
I usually join when others organize since I fear they will discriminate me 
if I say no to join  
   
To cooperate other members, I believe that it is my duty to participate in 
such kind of institutions without expecting any special gain  
   
I cannot get the money until I receive my pot, thus I like that commitment    
To protect myself from money request by relatives    
Now it is a habit for me    
I consider it as a gambling event    
Can’t save at home, money gets used on other things    
To get strength to save when I see other members in equb     
Group will make sure that each member had a certain item after winning 
the pot 
   
For safety reasons, fear of theft if I put it at home    
To visit each other’s house and see how other members live    
Because can’t save at home, my family will use it    
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Structured interview guideline questions for equb organizers 
 
1. Could you tell me about when and how you started to join equb? 
2. When did you start to organize equbs? 
3. What motivates you to organize equbs? 
4. Is it difficult to mobilize other members to join? What mechanisms do you usually use? 
5. Is it not difficult to compromise the different motives of members so that all will be 
satisfied and keep on participating? 
6. How do you solve it when conflict of interest occurs among members?   
7. Why do you think participants are motivated to join equbs? 
8. What is the benefit of organizing equb? Do you enjoy special benefit by organizing equbs? 
9. What do you think is the main problem in running equbs? 
10. Do you think that it is possible to transform equbs into formal institutions?  
11. Do you think that you will keep on organizing and participating in equbs in the future? 
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 Appendix III. Questionnaire distributed to respondents – Amharic version 
 
                                           በስዊድን የግብርና ሳይንስ ዩኒቨርሲቲ 
                                        የተፈጥሮ ኃብትና ግብርና ሳይንስ ፋኩልቲ 
                                             የኢኮኖሚክስ የትምሕርት ክፍል  
 በእቁብ ተሳታፊዎች የሚሞላ መጠይቅ 
 ውድ መላሽ 
 ብስራት አገኘሁ እባላለሁ:: በስዊድን የግብርና ሳይንስ ዩኒቨርሲቲ በቢዝነስና ኢኮኖሚክስ የትምሕርት ዘርፍ የሁለተኛ 
ዓመት የማስተርስ ዲግሪ ተማሪ ነኝ:: በአሁኑ ሰዓት የመመረቂያ ጽሁፌን “ተሳታፊዎችን እቁብ ለመግባት ምን 
ያነሳሳቸዋል?” በሚል ርዕስ በመጻፍ ላይ የምገኝ ሲሆን ይህ መጠይቅም ለጽሁፉ የሚሆን መረጃ ለመሰብሰብ የተዘጋጀ 
ነው::  
 ያለእርስዎ ቀና ትብብር ጥናቱ ግቡን ሊመታ አይችልም:: በመሆኑም መጠይቁን በእቁብ ተሳትፎዎ ካለዎት ልምድ 
በመነሳት እንዲሞሉልኝ እጠይቃለሁ:: የእርስዎ ምላሾች ለዚህ ጥናት ብቻ የሚውሉ መሆናቸውን እያረጋገጥኩ ስምዎትን 
መጥቀስም የማያስፈልግ መሆኑን እገልጻለሁ::  
 ስለ ትብብብርዎ በቅድሚያ አመሰግናለሁ! 
 
ማሳሰቢያ: የመልስ ምርጫዎን ከአማራጮቹ ፊት ለፊት ባለው ሳጥን ውስጥ የ “X” ምልክት በማድረግ ይግለጡ:: 
ከአንድ በላይ መልስ መስጠት እንደሚቻል ከተጠቀሰባቸው ጥያቄዎች በስተቀር ለሁሉም ጥያቄዎች አንድ 
መልስ ብቻ  እንዲመርጡ እጠይቃለሁ:: 
 
I. የግል መረጃ 
1. ጾታ            ሀ. ወንድ                          ለ. ሴት        
2. እድሜ 
   ሀ. ከ 20 በታች     ለ. 20 – 29     ሐ. 30 – 39      መ. 40 – 49     ሠ. 50 እና ከዚያ በላይ   
3. የጋብቻ ሁኔታ 
   ሀ.  ያገባ                   ለ.  ያላገባ                 ሐ.  የተፋታ            መ. በሞት የተለየ            
4. የትምህርት ደረጃ 
   ሀ. ማንበብና መጻፍ              ለ. አንደኛ ደረጃ ትምህርት            ሐ. ሁለተኛ ደረጃ ትምህርት           
   መ. ዲፕሎማ                     ሠ. የመጀመሪያ ዲግሪ                  ረ. ማሰተርስና ከዚያ በላይ     
5. የስራ ሁኔታ (ከአንድ በላይ መምረጥ ይችላሉ) 
   ሀ. የመንግስት ሠራተኛ        ለ. መንግስታዊ ያልሆነ ድርጅት ተቀጣሪ        ሐ. የግል ድርጅት ተቀጣሪ  
   መ. ነጋዴ                      ሠ. ገበሬ                 ረ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ _________________________________ 
6. ለጥያቄ ቁጥር 5 መልስዎ ነጋዴ ከሆነ የተሰማሩበትን የንግድ ዘርፍ ቢገልጹልኝ______________________________________ 
7. አማካይ ወርሃዊ ገቢዎ ምን ያህል ብር ይሆናል? _____________________________________________ 
8. በወር ምን ያህል ብር እቁብ ይጥላሉ? __________________________               
9. በየስንት ጊዜው የሚጣል እቁብ መግባት ይመርጣሉ?       ሀ. በየቀኑ            ለ. በየሳምንቱ                  
ሐ.  በየ15 ቀኑ     መ. በየወሩ     ሠ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ______________________________________________ 
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10. እቁብ መሳተፍ ከጀመሩ ምን ያህል ጊዜ ሆነዎት? 
                                                       የጊዜ ርዝመት  
 ከ 1ዓመት በታች ከ 1 – 3 ዓመት ከ 3 – 5 ዓመት ከ5 – 10 ዓመት  ከ10 ዓመት በላይ 
በአጠቃላይ በእቁብ    አሁን ባሉበት እቁብ    
 
11. ከሚከተሉት ተቋማት ውስጥ በየትኞቹ ውስጥ ተሳታፊ ነበሩ (ነዎት)? ለምን ያህል ጊዜ? 
 
 
                        የተቋሙ አይነት   
ተሳታፊ ሆነው
ያዉቃሉ? 
                 ተሳትፈው ካወቁ ለምን ያህል ጊዜ? እስካሁንም
ተሳታፊ ከሆኑ  የ 
”X” ምልክት 
ቢያደርጉልኝ 
አዎ የለም ከ 1 ዓመት
በታች 
ከ 1 – 3 
ዓመት 
ክ3 – 5 
ዓመት 
ከ 5 – 10 
ዓመት 
ከ 10 ዓመት
በላይ 
ባንክ  አስቀማጭ    
ተበዳሪ    
አነስተኛ ብድርና 
ቁጠባ ተቋም 
አስቀማጭ    
ተበዳሪ    
ኢንሹራንስ     
ማህበር    
እድር    
ደቦ    
ሌላ ካለ ቢጠቅሱ___________    
 
II. ስለ እቁብ ምርጫዎ እና የእቁብ መዋቅር 
1. እቁብ ለእርስዎ ምንድን ነው? (ከአንድ በላይ መምረጥ ይችላሉ) 
   ሀ. ልክ እንደ ባንክ፣ አነስተኛ ብድርና ቁጠባ ተቋም ወይም ኢንሹራንስ ሁሉ የገንዘብ ተቋም ነው  
   ለ. ከሌሎች ሰዎች ጋር ጓደኝነቴን የማጠናክርበት ተቋም                 
   ሐ. ለሌሎች ሰዎች አጋርነቴን የማሳይበት ተቋም ነው    
   መ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. የመጀመሪያ እቁብዎን ሲገቡ ምክንያትዎ ምን ነበር? (ከአንድ በላይ መምረጥ ይችላሉ) 
   ሀ. በአቅራቢያዬ ባንክም ሆነ አነስተኛ ብድርና ቁጠባ ተቋም ባለመኖሩ       ለ. ቋሚ ዕቃ ለመግዛት ፈልጌ    
   ሐ. ቤቴ ብቻዬን መቆጠብ ስላልቻልኩ                           መ. ጓድኞቼ እንድሳተፍ ጫና ስላሳደሩብኝ  
   ሠ. የመጀመሪያውን እጣ ለመውሰድ የፈለገ ጓደኛዬ ያዘጋጀው እቁብ ስለነበር እሱን ለመተባበር  
   ረ. በአካባቢዬ የነበሩ ሰዎች በአብዛኛው እቁብ ስለነበራቸው የተለየሁ ላለመሆን ፈለጌ  
   ሰ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. የእቁብ እጣ ለመውሰድ የትኛውን ጊዜ ይመርጣሉ? 
ሀ. መጀመሪያ ላይ                   ለ. መሐል ላይ                     ሐ. መጨረሻ ላይ                     
መ. ግድ የለኝም                     ሠ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ___________________________________________________ 
4. ለተራ ቁጥር 3 ለመረጡት ጊዜ ምክንያትዎት ምንድን ነው? ________________________________________________________ 
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5. ከሚከተሉት ውስጥ የትኛውን ይመርጣሉ? 
   ሀ.  እኔ በምፈልገው መሰረት በጽሁፍ ስምምነት ላይ የተመሰረተ አዲስ እቁብ ማደራጀት  
   ለ.  እኔ በምፈልገው መሰረት ያለ ጽሁፍ ስምምነት አዲስ እቁብ ማደራጀት  
   ሐ.  በጽሁፍ ስምምነት ላይ ተመስርቶ የተቋቋመ እቁብ መቀላቀል  
   መ.  ያለጽሁፍ ስምምነት የተቋቋመ እቁብ መቀላቀል  
   ሠ.  አዲስ  እቁብ ማቋቋም እመርጣለሁ ስምምነቱ ግን በጽሁፍ ቢሆንም ባይሆንም ግድ የለኝም  
   ረ.  የተቋቋመ እቁብ መቀላቀል እመርጣለሁ ስምምነቱ ግን በጽሁፍ ቢሆንም ባይሆንም ግድ የለኝም  
   ሰ.  ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
6. የእቁብ አደላደልን መሰረት በማድረግ መምረጥ ቢኖርብዎት የትኛውን እቁብ መቀላቀል ይመርጣሉ? 
   ሀ.  አደላደሉ በሎተሪ ወይም በእጣ የሆነበትን እቁብ                  ለ.  አደላደሉ በጨረታ የሆነበት እቁብ  
   ሐ.  አደላደሉ የአባላትን የገንዘብ ፍላጎት መሰረት በማድረግ በየጊዜዉ የሚወሰንበትን እቁብ  
   መ.  ስለ አደላደሉ ግድ የለኝም  
   ሠ.  ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልን_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7. የእቁብ ድልድሉ መቼ እንዲወሰን ይፈለጋሉ? 
ሀ. አጠቃላይ ድልድሉ በእቁቡ መጀመሪያ ላይ ቢወጣ እፈልጋለሁ    ለ. አሸናፊው በየጊዜው ቢደለደል ደስ 
ይለኛል      ሐ. በፈለገው መንገድ ቢደለደል ችግር የለብኝም  
      መ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8. ወደ እቁብ ከመግባትዎ በፊት ወይም ለመግባት ሲያስቡ የወጭ ገቢ ምዘና ይሰራሉ?   ሀ. አዎ       ለ. የለም   
9. ለተራ ቁጥር 8 መልስዎ አዎ ከሆነ ወጭ ገቢ ምዘና ለመስራት ምን ምን ነገሮችን ግንዛቤ ውስጥ ያስገባሉ?____________ 
    _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
10. እቁብ ሲጥሉ ገንዘቡ ከጊዜ ጋር ተያይዞ ስለሚኖረው የዋጋ መውጣትና መውረድ አስበው ያውቃሉ?   
      ሀ. አዎ             ለ. የለም   
11. በእቁብ ገንዘብ ላይ ወለድ መተሳሰብ ቢጀመር ጥሩ ነው ብለው ያስባሉ?    ሀ. አዎ              ለ. የለም      
ለምን? ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
12. ሁልጊዜ እቁብ ከመግባትዎ በፊት ከትዳር አጋርዎ ጋር ይነጋገራሉ?  ሀ. አዎ              ለ. የለም      ለምን? 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
13. በተመሳሳይ  ጊዜ ከአንድ በላይ እቁብ ይሳተፋሉ? ለምን?________________________________________________________________ 
14. እርስዎ በሚሳተፉበት እቁብ በአማካይ ምን ያህል ተሳታፊዎች ቢኖሩ ጥሩ ነው ብለው ያስባሉ?  
ሀ. ከ10 በታች                    ለ. ከ 10 – 20                        ሐ. ከ 21 – 30                             
መ. ከ 30 በላይ                  ሠ. ግድ የለኝም                       ረ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ_________________ 
15. በእርስዎ እይታ የአንድ ሙሉ ዙር እቁብ አማካይ ርዝማኔ ምን ያህል ቢሆን ጥሩ ነው? 
ሀ. ከ 6 ወር በታች            ለ. ከ 6 ወር – 1 ዓመት           ሐ. ከ 1 ዓመት – 2 ዓመት                  
መ. ከ 2 ዓመት በላይ         ሠ. ግድ የለኝም               ረ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ ____________________________ 
16. ለተራ ቁጥር 15 መልስዎ የጠቀሱትን ያህል ጊዜ ለምን መረጡ? ________________________________________________________  
17. እርስዎ ሊገቡበት ያሰቡት እቁብ ውስጥ የሚገኙ ሌሎች አባላቶች ምን መስፈርት ሊያሟሉ ይገባል ብለው ያስባሉ? 
(ከ1 በላይ መምረጥ ይችላሉ) 
   ሀ. አባላት የስጋ ዝምድና ያላቸው መሆን አለባቸው   
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   ለ. አባላት በተመሳሳይ የስራ መስክ ወይም የገቢደረጃ ላይ የሚገኙ መሆን አለባቸው  
   ሐ. አባላት በአንድ የመኖሪያ አካባቢ የሚኖሩ መሆን አለባቸው                  
   መ. አባላት ከተመሳሳይ ብሄር መሆን አለባቸው    ሠ. አባላት የተመሳሳይ ኃይማኖት ተከታይ መሆን አለባቸው   
   ረ.  ስለአባላት ስብጥር ግድ የለኝም  
   ሰ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ_______________________________________________________________________________________________  
18. ለተራ ቁጥር 17 መልስዎ የጠቀሱትን መስፈርት ለምን መረጡ? ________________________________________________________  
19. እቁብ መሳተፍን እንደ ማህበራዊ ግዴታዎ አስበውት ያውቃሉ?      ሀ. አዎ              ለ. የለም   
20. እርስዎ እየተሳተፉበት ካሉት እቁብ አባላት አንዱ ለእርስዎ የደረሰውን እጣ እንዲቀይሩት ቢጠይቅዎ ፍቃደኛ 
ይሆናሉ? ለምን? _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
21. እርስዎስ ለሌላ አባል የደረሰ እጣ እንዲቀይርዎ ጠይቀው ያውቃሉ?      ሀ. አዎ              ለ. የለም   
22. ለተራ ቁጥር 21 መልስዎ አዎ ከሆነ የእጣውን ገንዘብ ለምን ለመጠቀም ነበር የቀየሩት? 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
23.በአንድ አጋጣሚ ለእቁብ መክፈል የሚገባዎትን ክፍያ መክፈል አቃተወት ብለን እናስብ:: መክፈል አለመቻልዎ ያን 
ያህል ያስጨንቅዎታል? 
   ሀ. አዎ                     ለ. የለም   
24. ለተራ ቁጥር 23 መልስዎ አዎ ከሆነ ከሚከተሉት ውስጥ የበለጠ የሚያስጨንቅዎት የትኛው ምክንያት ነው? 
   ሀ. ጉዳዩ ወደ ፍርድ ቤት ስለሚሄድና ህጋዊ እርምጃ ሊያስወስድብኝ ስለሚችል  
   ለ. ወደ ፊት በሚኖረኝ የእቁብ ተሳትፎ ላይ ተአማኒነት ስለሚያሳጣኝና አሉታዊ ተጽእኖ ስለሚኖረው  
   ሐ. ከእቁቡ አባላት ጋር ወደ ፊት በሚኖሩኝ ሌሎች ማህበራዊ ግንኙነቶች ላይ ተጽእኖ ስለሚኖረው   
 መ. የእቁቡ አባል ከልሆኑ ሌሎች የማህበረሰቡ አባላት  ጋር ወደ ፊት በሚኖሩኝ ሌሎች ማህበራዊ ግንኙነቶች ላይ    
ተጽእኖ ስለሚኖረው  
   ሠ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
25. ለተራ ቁጥር 23 መልስዎ የለም የሚል ከሆነ እንዳይጨነቁ የሚያደርግዎት ምክንያት ምንድን ነው? 
   ሀ. የእቁቡ አባላት ችግሬን ተረድተው ተጨማሪ የመክፈያ ጊዜ ስለሚሰጡኝ  
   ለ. የእቁቡ አባላት ችግሬን ተረድተውና ለጊዜው ያለውን ክፍያ ሰርዘውልኝ ሳልከፍል እንድቀጥል ስለሚፈቅዱልኝ  
   ሐ. ወደፊት ከእቁቡ አባላት ጋር በሚኖረኝ ግንኙነት ምንም ዓይነት ተጽእኖ ስለማይኖረው  
   መ. ሌሎች እቁቦችን ከመቀላቀል ስለማያግደኝ  
   ሠ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
III. ስለ እቁብ፣ እቁብ የመግባት ፍላጎትና መደበኛ የፋይናንስ ሴክተር 
1. አባል ለመሆን የንብረት ዋስትና ማስያዝ በሚያስፈልግባቸው እቁቦች ተሳትፈው ያውቃሉ? ሀ. አዎ   ለ. የለም   
2. በአሁኑ ሰአት እየተሳተፉበት ያሉት እቁብስ ለአባልነት የንብረት ማስያዣ ይጠየቅበታል? ሀ. አዎ     ለ. የለም   
3. ባንኮች ወይም አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋሞች ጋር መስራትእየቻሉ ለምን እቁብ መሳተፍዎን ቀጠሉ? (ከአንድ በላይ 
መምረጥ ይችላሉ) 
   ሀ. በአቅራቢያዬ ባንክም ሆነ አነስተኛ ብድርና ቁጠባ ተቋም ባለመኖሩ  
   ለ. ባንኮች ወይም አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋሞች ለተቀማጭ ገንዘብ የሚከፍሉት ወለድ መጠን አነስተኛ ስለሆነ  
 ሐ. ባንኮች ወይም አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋሞች ለማበደር የሚጠይቁት ወለድ መጠን ከፍተኛ ስለሆነ ከነሱ   
መበደር ውድ ስለሆነ  
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   መ. ከባንኮች ወይም አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋሞች አገልግሎት ለማግኘት የሚፈጀው ጊዜ ረጅም ስለሆነ  
   ሠ. በባንክ ወይም አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋም ስርአቱ ላይ ሙሉ እምነት ስለሌለኝ  
   ረ. ገንዘብ ለማስቀመጥ በባንኮች ወይም በብድርና ቁጠባ ተቋሞች ያለው የአሰራር ስርአት ስለማይመቸኝ  
ሰ. ከባንኮች ወይም አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋሞች ገንዘብ ብበደር ገንዘቡን የፈለኩት ቦታ ላይ የማዋል ሙሉ 
ነጻነት ስለማይኖረኝ  
   ሸ. እቁብ ጋር ጥሩ የሆነ ልምድ ስላለኝ መተው አልፈልግም  
   ቀ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. ከሚከተሉት ተቋማት ውስጥ ለእርስዎ ከእቁብ የሚያገኙትን አገልግሎት ሊተካልዎት የሚችለው የትኛው ነው? 
   ሀ. ባንክ              ለ. አነስተኛ የብድና ቁጠባ ተቋም               ሐ. እድር            መ. ማሕበር     
   ሠ. ምንም ሊተካው አይችልም                ረ. ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ__________________________________________ 
5. እንደሚታወቀው በአሁኑ ሰዓት በአገሪቱ የተለያዩ አከስዮን ማህበሮች በመቋቋም ላይ ናቸው:: የእነዚህ ማህበሮች 
እየበዙ መሄድ ወደፊት እቁብ ለመግባትና ላለመግባት በሚኖረዎ ውሳኔ ላይ ተጽእኖ የሚኖረው ይመስልዎታል?   
     ሀ. አዎ          ለ. የለም   
6. በእስከዛሬ የእቁብ ቆይታዎ  ከሌሎች አባላት ጋር እቁባችሁን ወደ መደበኛ የፋይናንስ ተቋም (ለምሳሌ የብድርና 
ቁጠባ ህብረት ስራ ማህበር) ለማሸጋገር አስባችሁና ተወያይታችሁ ታውቃላችሁ?     ሀ. አዎ     ለ. የለም    
7. ለተራ ቁጥር 6 መልስዎ አዎ ከሆነ አዲስ ለማቋቋም ባሰባችሁት ተቋም ውስጥ የእቁብን እሴቶች ሙሉ በሙሉ 
ማግኘት የሚችሉ  ይመስልዎታል? ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8. ለተራ ቁጥር 6 መልስዎ የለም ከሆነ ምክንያትዎ ምንድን ነው?__________________________________________________________ 
9. ስለ እቁብ አደራጆች ያለዎትን አመለካከት በአጭሩ ቢገልጹልኝ _________________________________________________________   
IV. የማጠቃለያ ጥያቄዎች 
1. በአጠቃላይ በእቁቦች አደረጃጀት ፣ መዋቅር ፣ እንዲሁም እንቅስቃሴና አገልግሎት ደስተኛ ነዎት? ካልሆኑ ምን ምን 
ነገሮች ቢስተካከሉ  ጥሩ ነው ይላሉ?_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. በእቁብ ተሳትፎዎ እርስዎ በቋሚነት እየተሳተፉባቸው በነበሩባቸው እቁቦች የመዋቅር ወይም የአሰራር ለውጥ 
አስተውለው ያውቃሉ? . አዎ       ለ. የለም     አዎ ካሉ የተመለከቷቸውን ለውጦች ቢገልጹልኝ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. በእቁቦች ላይ የሚስተዋለው ትልቅ ችግር ምንድን ነው ብለው ያስባሉ?__________________________________________________ 
4. ወደፊት እቁብ ከመሳተፍ ሊያግድዎት የሚችል ምክንያት ቢኖር ምንድን ነው? _________________________________________  
5. እባክዎን ከሚከተሉት ውስጥ የትኛው ምክንያት እቁብ ለመግባት አነሳስቶዎት እንደሚያውቅ ከፊት ለፊት ካሉት 
አማራጮች ላይ ምልክት  በማድረግ ይግለጹ:: 
                                              እቁብ ለመግባት ያነሳሳዎ ምክንያት                        መለኪያ
እስማማለሁ ገለልተኛ አልስማማም
መደበኛ የገንዘብ ተቋማትን አገልግሎት ለማግኘት እድሉ ስለሌለኝ    
መደበኛ የገንዘብ ተቋማትን አገልግሎት ለማግኘት የሚጠየቀው ዋጋ ውድ ስለሆነ    
ትንሽ ገንዘብ ለመቆጠብ ወይም ለመበደር ወደ መደበኛ የገንዘብ ተቋማት መሄድ ስለማፍር    
ቋሚ እቃ ለመግዛት ስለፈለኩ    
ለወደ ፊት የጥሬ ገንዘብ ፍላጎቴ እንደ መድህን ዋስትና (ኢንሹራንስ) ስለምቆጥረው    
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የማውቃቸው ሰዎች እቁብ አደራጅተው እንድገባ ሲጠይቁኝ እምቢ ብል ከሌሎች ማህበራዊ ግንኙነቶች እንዳያገሉኝ
ስለምፈራ 
   
ምንም አይነት የተለየ ጥቅም ባላገኝም እንኳን በእንደዚህ አይነት ተቋሞች የመሳተፍ ማህበራዊ ግዴታ አለብኝ ብዬ
ስለማስብ 
   
እቁብ ከገባሁ እጣ ካልደረሰኝ በስተቀር ገንዘቤን እንደፈለኩ ስለማላገኘውና ይህን የእቁብ ባህርይ ስለምወደው    
የተለያዩ ዘመዶቼ ገንዘብ በየጊዜው ገንዘብ ስለሚጠይቁኝ እቁብን እንደ ማምለጫ ለመጠቀም    
እቁብ መግባት ልማድ ስለሆነብኝ    
እቁብን እንደ ቁማር ስለምቆጥረው    
ብቻዬን ገንዘብ መቆጠብ ስላልቻልኩ (ገንዘቡን ብዙም የማልፈልጋቸውን እቃዎች በመግዛት ስለማጠፋው)    
ብቻዬን ገንዘብ መቆጠብ ስላልቻልኩ (ገንዘቡን ለቤተሰብ ወጪ ሊውል ስለሚችል)    
ሌሎች የእቁብ አባላት ሲቆጠቡ በማዬት ተመሳሳይ ጥንካሬ ማግኘት ስለምፈልግ    
እቁባችን እጣ በደረሰን ሰአት እያንዳንዱአባል የሆነ እቃ መግዛቱን ስለሚያረጋግጥና ይህን ነገር ስለወደድኩት    
ገንዘቡን ቤቴ ባስቀምጠው ይሰረቃል ብዬ ስለምሰጋ ለደህንነቱ ስል እቁብ እገባለሁ    
እቁቡን የሚያስተናግደውን ተረኛ ሰው ቤት የማየት እድሉን ስለሚፈጥርና ይህም የህይወት ተሞክሮ ለመለዋዎጥ
ስለሚረዳ 
   
ሌላ ካለ ቢገልጹልኝ    
                   
                                ከእቁብ አደራጆች ጋር ለሚኖር ቃለመጠይቅ የሚሆኑ መሪ ጥያቄዎች 
1. እቁብ መቼና እንዴት መሳተፍ እንደጀመሩ ቢገልጹልኝ 
2. እቁብ ማደራጄት መቼና እንዴት እንደጀመሩ ቢያብራሩልኝ 
3. እቁብ ለማደራጀት ምን አነሳሳዎ? 
4. ሰዎች እቁብ እንዲገቡ ማነሳሳት ከባድ ነው? ምን ምን ዘዴዎችንስ ይጠቀማሉ? 
5. በጣም የተለያዬ ፍላጎት ያላቸውን ሰዎች በአንድ እቁብ እንዲሳተፉ ማድረግና ያን አቻችሎ ሁሉም አባላት ደስተኛ 
ሆነው እቁቡ እንዲቀጥል ማድረግ ምን ያህል አስቸጋሪ ነው? 
6. በአባላት መካከል የጥቅም ግጭት ሲኖር እንዴት ትፈቱታላችሁ? 
7. አብዛኞቹን ተሳታፊዎች እቁብ እንዲገቡ የሚያነሳሳቸው ምክንያት ምንድን ነው ብለው ያስባሉ? 
8. የእቁብ አደራጅ መሆን ጥቅሙ ምንድን ነው? የተለዬ ጥቅም ያስገኛል? ጉዳቱስ? 
9. እቁቦችን ወደ መደበኛ የፋይናንስ ተቋምነት መቀዬር ይቻላል ብለው ያስባሉ? 
10. ወደ ፊት እቁብ በመሳተፍ እንዲሁም በማደራጀት የሚቀጥሉ ይመስልዎታል? ለምን? 
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                   Appendix IV: Sample written agreement of big equbs 
 
 
